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LiW'l'GUAGE AND LOGICAL THINKING STRUCTURES IN 
THE NORMALLY HEARING AND DEAF 
· Daphne E. Millar 
The performance of twelve deaf subjects with an extremely 
poor comprehension of language and control over language 
structure, was compared with that of a normally hearing 
control group on four tasks of formal thinking. Six 
deaf subjects performed at the formal operational level 
on at least one task, supporting the hypothesis that· 
formal thinking can develop to its. primary format.ion in 
the severely linguistically deprived. The implications 
of the findings £or certain cognitive theories and for 
educational practice are presented. 
Introduction 
Piaget clearly delineates symbolic functioning and 
operative thinking, placing himself in opposition to any 
view that considers language as a central, constitutive 
component of operative thinking (Furth, 1969). The 
origins of logico-mathematical structures are identified 
in the co-ordination of actions at the preverbal sensory-
motor stage. Bruner (1966) considers internalized 
language to be a prerequisite for logical thinking, 
relating the child's organization of experience to 




1. The deaf experimental group, by virtue of language 
deprivation, will be significantly inferior to a 
hearing control in language comprehension and control 
over language structure, failing to achieve by 
adolescence the average linguistic competence of a 
mature speaker of a language. 
2. On Piaget-type tasks, adapted for non-verbal 
presentation, the performance of the deaf experimental 
group will not be significantly inferior to that of 
the normally hearing control. -
3. The acquisition of formal operational structures does 
not need as a prerequisite the average linguistic 
competence of a mature speaker of a language as 
measured by performance on two specified language 
tests. 
Subjects: 
The experimental group comprised twelve deaf subjects 
.fulfilling the following criteria: (a) loss of hearing before 
CA 18 months; (b) hearing loss greater than 77 db. in the 
better ear; (c) age on first admission to school between 2:6 
and 7:4; (d) no secondary physical defect nor any accompanying 
behavioural problems; (e) etiology of hearing loss was 
considered. Fourteen subjects with normal auditory acuity 
comprised the control group. The mean age of both groups was 
13:10. The mean IQs of the deaf and hearing groups were 
108.4 and 107.4 respectively. 
Tests Administered: 
The Snijders Oomen Non-verbal Intelligence Scale 
Paragraph Meaning Test - Junior Form A 
Woodward's Nonsense Test of Structural Meaning 
Four Piaget-type tasks were adapted in order to exclude or 
minimize the use of language in instruction and as a criterion of 
success. Instructions ~ere given mainly by pictorial 
representation. The tasks involved: 
viii 
Judgement of displaced volume 
Probability concepts and probabilistic responses 
Judgement and measurement of equivalent three dimensional 
space 
Combinations of chemicals. 
Analysis of Results: 
The inferiority of the deaf_ group on both language tests 
was statistically significant at the .001 level (Mann-Whitney 
U test). The application of the x2 and Fisher exact probability 
tests supported the hypothesis that the inferiority of the deaf 
on the Piaget-type tasks was not statistically signifi_cant. Six 
deaf subjects performed at the formal operational level on at 
least one task. 
Discussion 
The efficacy of evaluating cognitive level on Piaget's 
tasks by means of manual responses alone ~eeds further 
experimental investigation. Level of achievement on the 
Piaget-type tasks was largely independent of performance on 
either of the language tests," lending support to Piaget's 
theoretical position. The role of language as a determinant 
of cognitive development must be distinguished from the role of 
language as facilitating cognitive skills~ The performance of 
six deaf subjects at the formal operational level suggests that 
language does not play a truly constitutive role in the-
development of logical structures, while it is conceded that 
language may play a supportive role in the elaboration of 
logical structures. 
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Implications for Education 
The findings of the present study suggest the need 
to provide the language-handicapped child with the opportunity 
to use operational thinking structures by presenting problems 
non-verbally and with manipulable materials in order to 
encourage learning through action in a situation in which the 
child is not penalized for linguistic incompetence. 
Main References 
Bruner, J. On cognitive growth: I & II. In J. Bruner, 
R. Olver & P. Greenfield (Eds.), Studies in 
cognitive growth. New York: Wiley, 1966. 
Furth, H. Piaget and knowledge: theoretical foundations. 
New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1969. 
PART I 
BACKGROUND TO THE PRESENT STUDY 
A. PIAGET'S CONCEPTION .OF THINKING AND SYMBOL FORMATION. 
Critical aspects of Piaget's position on logical 
thinking in relation to symbolic· functioning have .recently 
/ . 
stimulated comment (Sutton-Smith, 1966; Ausubel, 1965; 
Inhelder et al, 1966; Furth, 1967). 
Berlyne (1957, 1965) has postulated an aff1nity · 
between Piagetian and neobehaviouristic theory on conceptions 
of thought and mediatio??-al hypotheses ·about the nature of 
meaning. Ausubel (op. cit.) analyzes Piaget's views oh the 
nature and development of symbolic functioning to assess the 
extent to which this claimed parallelism is warranted. He 
focuses on what he describes as a 11 currently unresolved 
contradiction in Piaget's theory" (~., · P• 1031). Piaget 
'is said to postulate a qualitative continuity between the 
motor- or action-basis of early and later manifestations of 
thought, while denying such continuity between the motor and 
\verbal stages of symbolic representation. Ausubel concedes 
' 
that internalized actions may serve as signifiers during the 
preoperational stage when symbolization may be dependent on 
deferred imitation, but claims that there is no.empirical 
evidence to support the assumption that such actions continue 
to serve a signifying function once verbal symbolization 
becomes consolidated. Ausubel contends that there is no 
3 
Piaget (1966) has clarified the place of 
representation in his model, in response to current mis-
interpretations of his position (Sutton-Smith, op. cit.). --
He relates representation to the semiotic or symbolic £unction 
of intelligence, placing it midway between operational 
·I activities and motoric output. Imaginal symbols and 
linguistic signs, the products of representation, are not 
constituent elements of operative knowing. Knowing, in 
Piaget's theory, is never reduced to representation. 
Piaget (1951, p. 69) states that the primary 
purpose of the representational process is one of 
differentiation between a signifier and that which the 
i signifier represents, namely the significate. The symbolic 
function is characterised by the capacity to evoke, by means 
, of differentiated signifiers, significates that are not present. 
A symbol, as something that signifies and represents has a 
. descriptive or· figurative component, which refers to some 
, sensory or motoric event. Piaget suggests that it derives 
developmentally by internalization from external motoric 
imitation. A preoperational scheme is accommodated to the 
figurative-descriptive aspect Of a state of reality. He 
classifies symbolic instruments as derived from accommodative 
imitations of two sources: gestural or imaginal, for example, 
the observable movements of play; and linguistic, the 
conventional audible and motoric linguistic utterance. 
I\ 
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The operative aspect of a symbol, as distinct from 
the figurative aspect, refers to meaning, that is, to its 1 
·
1 significate. It therefore embodies the basic act of 
differentiation between the signifier ~d the significate. 
A second characteristic of the operative aspect is the 
symbol's assimilation to operative schemes, that is, action 
schemes in the form of pre-operational schemes or logical 
operations. The operative component takes account of 
transformations and builds upon sensory-motor actions, 
interiorized actions and thought operations. The symbolic 
instrument, that is, the figurative aspect of the symbol, 
must therefore not be confused with symbolic thought, which 
! is symbolic behaviour in its totality, including the 
I 
figurative and the operative component. 
"The figural ·aspects of cognitive functions are 
never sufficient to explain representative or conceptual, 
knowledge" (Piaget, 1966, p. 111). The figurative components' 
role is useful only to the degree to which they are subordinate 
to the operative component. This distinction between the plane 
of operativity and the plane of representation inherent in the 
figurative aspect of a symbolA allows for a specification of the ,. 
relation between the symbol and the real event. Representation 
is not passively inherent in the symbol. It functions only 
1 through the operation which has produced or' comprehended the 
figurative aspect as a symbol initially. 
5 
Piaget (~~) bases his conception of intellectual 
operations on the premise that to know or to understand means 
transforming reality and assimilating it to schemes of 
transformation. Thinking is an action that transforms one 
reality state into another and in this process leads to 
knowledge of the state. This active, transformational 
aspect of thinking constitutes the unifying link between 
preoperational action schemes and formal operations. 
Any symbolic event, be it linguistic or imaginal, 
1 constitutes a figurative and an operative component. It is 
however the operative component which is instrumental in 
determining the level at which reality is comprehended. 
The figurative aspects therefore cannot explain intellectual 
functioning, since they are totally dependent on the level 
of operative thinking. 
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B. THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE IN COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT. 
B.l. Piaget's Views. 
In his early writings Piaget (1926) did not directly 
concern himself with the problem of the relation of language 
and intellectual opercitions, though these works suggest a 
belief in close relations between language and thinking since 
the emphasis is on verbal thought. Later works show a clear.er 
insight into the action-derived_ structure of operational 
thinking and cons~quently find no logic for incorporating 
language as an explanatory principle. Today Piaget stands. the 
lone exponent of logical intelligence who does not include 
language as an intrinsically necessary element of operational 
thinking. 
The origin of the current theoretical status of the 
language-thought relationship in Piaget's work has been 
related by him (1963) to his observations regardihg the nature 
of sensory-motor intelligence before the acquisition of 
language. Analysing the proposition that language is ipso 
facto a sufficient condition for the formation of intellectual 
operations, after identifying the philosophical roots of such a 
proposition in the position taken by logical positivism, Piaget 
(~.) poses an important problem. Are the origins of 
? intellectual operations to be looked for in verbal behaviour 
or do they precede language? 
7 
At the preverbal sensory-motor period a system 0£ 
schemes is elaborated that prefigures certain features of the 
structure of relations and classes. The baby will reach a 
distant object by pulling the blanket on which it rests and 
will generalize this action-scheme by utilizing other supports 
to bring objects to him in many situations. In the presence 
of a new object, the baby will assimilate it by applying to it 
successively all the schemes he has available. The coordination 
of sensory-motor action schemes results further in prefigurations 
of elementary forms of conservation and operative reversibility. 
Between 6 and 18 months the scheme of the permanent object 
develops. This scheme constitutes the first "invariant of a 
group". The search for an object that is hidden is a function 
of its localizations. These localizations depend on the 
constitution of a "group" of displacements in which are 
coordinated detours and returns, which correspond respectively 
to associativity and reversibility. 
The coordination and decentrations of the sensory-
motor period can be found in a different form playing a role 
in the constitution of operational intelligence, which is thus 
rooted in action. By the end of the sensory-motor period the 
baby will have overcome his early perceptual and motor egocentrism 
through a series of decentrations and coordinations, before the 
appearance of language. 
8 
The formation of representational thought is 
contemporaneous with the acquisition of language, however both 
are linked to the more general process which is the symbolic 
function. Language is but a part of a large complex of 
processes that occur during the second year of life and as 
such partakes of the entire cognitive development of this 
vital period. The development of the symbolic £'unction is 
!linked to the development of intelligent behaviour in its 
totality. It follows therefore, that the acquisition of 
language is not sufficient for providing thinking with ready-
made structures. There can be no external imposition of ready-
made structures through the medium of linguistic constructs, 
since a verbal transmission of information relative to 
operational structures will be assimilated only at levels 
where these structures have already been elaborated as 
interiorized actions(~. p. 127). Piaget clearly opposes 
any view that considers a particular symbolic product, such as 
language, to be·a central, constitutive component of operative 
. thinking. 
The question arises within the Piagetian framework, 
as to whether language, though not a sufficient condition, may 
be a necessary condition for the formation of operations. 
Piaget does not consider language even a necessary condition. 
for the constitution of concrete operations. As regards the 
level.of formal or hypothetico-deductive operations, he stresses 
the need for research to provide a decisive answer. Formal 
operations no longer bear upon objects themselves and upon the 
9 
immediately present, but on propositions and hypotheses. 
Hypothetico-deductive and propositional operations are 
manifestly more closely linked to language. Piaget remarks 
I 
however, that " ••• just as operations take root before 
language in the coordinations of actions, they go beyond 
language in the sense that the operational propositional 
structures constitute rather complex systems that are not 
inscribed as systems in the language " ••• (ibid. P• 127). 
These systems are the lattice of possible combinations, that 
replaces the simple hierarchical ordering of concrete operations, 
and the group of four transformations that coordinate the two 
forms of reversibility, namely, inversions and reciprocals, 
that at the concrete operational level were separated as 
groupings of classification and seriation. Neither can be 
formulated in ordinary language. They are expressed in 
logico-mathematical models by Piaget. The extent of the 
supportive role of language in the actual elaboration of these 
logical structures is left an operi question by Piaget. The 
origins of logico-mathematical structures are however explicitly 
identified by Piaget as being anterior to language: 
" ••• the roots of the logico-mathematical 
structures must go far deeper than language 
and must extend to the general coordination 
of actions found at the elementary behaviour 
levels, and even to sensory-motor intelligence! 
sensory-motor schemes already include order of 
movements, embedding of a sub-scheme into a 
total scheme and establishing correspondences". 
(Piaget and Inhelder, 1969). 
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B~2. Bruner's Views. 
The position taken by the Harvard Center for Cognitive 
Studies on the relation of thinking and language is perhaps most 
concisely outlined in Bruner's paper 11 The course of cognitive 
growth" (1964). He distinguishes three systems of processing 
information that the child acquires to represent recurrent 
features in his environment; enactive, iconic and symbolic 
represent at ion. The enactive mode refers to the representation 
of events through motoric response patterns, iconic relates to 
perceptual imagery and symbolic to internalized language as a 
)vehicle for organising experience. Research has focussed on 
the transition from iconic to symbolic representation, 11 For it 
is in the development o_f symbolic representation that one finds, 
perhaps, the greatest thicket of psychological problems" (ibid. 
Addressing himself to the language-thought relationship, 
Bruner describes the role of language as twofold. Language 
provides a means for representing and ordering experience, but 
Jalso transforms it according to the transformational rules of 
grammar •. Language becomes internalized as a cognitive 
instrument making possible an extremely flexible and powerful 
representation and systematic transformation of experience. 
He refers to Vygotsky's (1962) book on language and thought, 
seeming to take.a stand along with Soviet psychology on the 
internalized linguistic system. Bruner speaks of internalized 
speech as a prerequisite for logical thinking. To succeed in 
Piaget's conservation tasks, the child must, according to 
Bruner, employ some internalized_yerbal formula that shields 
11 
him from the overpowering appearance of the perceptual 
display. 
Referring to experiments (Olver, 1966; Rigney, 1966; 
Nair, 1963; Mosher, 1962; Bruner and Kenney, 1966) said to 
show how language shapes the child's modes of processing 
information, Bruner states that the models the growing child 
constructs to go beyond present information seem to be 
governed by syntactical rather than associative rules. The 
language the child brings to bear on a task will enable him to 
make remote reference to states and constraints that are not 
given by the immediate situation, while the.structural and 
semantic complexity will enable him to cumulate information 
into a structure that can be operat!d on by specific linguistic 
transformational rules. 
To go beyond the immediately perceptual, to a more 
extended model of the environment, the child requires a system 
that allows him to deal with the non-present. Dealing with 
things that are remote from the present situation has been 
acknowledged as the crucial feature of language. Between the 
ages.4 and 12 language becomes increasingly influential as an 
implement of knowing. The translation of experience into 
symbolic form, with the resulting ability to achieve remote 
reference, transformation and combination, "opens up realms of 
intellectual possibility" that Bruner claims could never be 
attained even by a powerful image forming system. The 
domination of perceptual representation .hinders the development 
of the processing of information by consecutive inferential 
12 
steps that take one beyond what is present. Once the child 
uses language as a medium for translating experience, there is 
a progressive release from immediacy. By representing what 
lies beyond the immediate cues, he can integrate long 
sequences of events and consider a range of possibilities in 
a problem solving situation •• 
Quoting the conclusion of Miller and Chomsky 
(1963, p. 488) that 11 •••• sentences have a compelling power 
to control both thought and action", Bruner (1966) considers 
how sentences might have this power. Describing some of the 
properties of language, namely hierarchy, categoriality, 
· predication, causation and modification, he expresses the 
belief that " •••• in order for the child to use language as an 
instrument of thought, he must bring th~ world of experience 
under the control of principles of organization that are in 
some degree isomorphic with the structural principles.of 
syntax" (~. P• 47). This discussion has a direct bearing 
on Piaget's unconditional assertion that language is in no way 
sufficient to assure the transmission of operational structures 
ready-made (See Section B. 1.). In support 0£ this, Piaget 
points out that it is only at the level of concrete operations 
that a child masters the use of inclusive definitions in spite 
of the classificatory hierarchy found in language. Verbal 
expressions referring to inclusion of a subclass within a 
class are not fully comprehended until the concrete operational 
level when inclusion becomes established as a result of the 
interplay of additive and multiplicative operations of classes. 
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Bruner and his associates, frequently using such phrases as 
"reorganizing experience and action to conform to the 
requirements of language", do not sufficiently take 
cognizance of and critically appraise Piaget's account of 
the sources of operations being anterior to language and the 
argument that verbal information will only be effectively 
assimilated to structures if these structures have been 
elaborated on the plane of actions or .operations. 
Bruner's views did not pass unchallenged by the 
Genevan research team. The reply of Inhelder et al (1966) 
serves " ••• to clarify certain basic differences in theory 
and methodology between the Harvard and Genevan cognitive 
growth projects •••" (p. 160). Discussion centred on 
experimental data and will therefore be included in the 
Section c. 
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C. REVIEW OF SELECTED EXPERIMENTAL APPROACHES PERTAINING 
TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT. 
C.1. The effects of learning verbal formulations on operation~. 
The aims of this approach, exemplified in the work of 
Inhelder et al (op. cit.) and Sinclair-de-Zwart (1969), are 
firstly, to determine whether the profound modification 
occurring in the·child's thinking with the constitution of the 
first concrete operations is paralleled by a linguistic 
development and secondly, to ascertain whether a child who has 
not yet spontaneously acquired a certain operation will show 
operatory progress after having undergone verbal training. 
Such training would focus on systematic teaching of expressions 
typically used by children already in possession of the operation 
in question. 
A conservation of liquids and seriation task w~e 
chosen, since they require an understanding and use of 
quantitative and dimensional terms and comparatives. The child 
was required to describe simple situations, unrelated to 
conservation and seriation tasks, which had been devised to 
explore his language of description in this domain. In addition, 
the child's comprehension of the exaniner's verbal instructions, 
couched in certain relevant expressions, was determined. 
Subsequently all children were tested to determine whether they 
had the concept of conservation on the Piagetian tasks. Results 
concurred with Bruner (1964, p. 5.) in that the use and structure 
of language patterns closely paralleled the operational behaviour 
structure of the child. The use of comparatives, differentiated 
15 
terms and- co-ordinated description of a difference in two 
dimensions occurred with greater frequency among children with 
conservation. It was noted however that these terms were 
sometimes available to children, yet not spontaneously used 
in certain situations. The operational structure therefore 
appears to be a prior acquisition to that of coding the event 
sequences into comparatives and co-ordinated terms. The 
difficulties the child experiences in the use of these 
expressions appear to be the same as those he is confronted 
• with in the development of the operations themselves, namely 
lack ·of decentration and incapacity to co-ordinate. 
"The possession of certain expressions does 
not structure operations nor does their 
absence impede their formation; the 
expressions are acquired and their use 
becomes functional according to a process 
similar to the mode of structuring of the 
operations themselves, namely through an 
interplay of decentrations and co-ordinations" 
(Sinclair-de-Zwart, 1967, quoted by Furth, 
1968, p. 130). 
Subjects without conservation were given verbal 
training in the use of' operational terms, and post-training 
tests of conservation were administered. Conservation was 
·not achieved even by those children who managed to acquire 
the terms in which to express it. Conclusions were that 
language learning might serve to direct the subjects' 
attention to important aspects of the problem, but it does not 
ipso facto bring about the integration and co-ordination of 
information necessary to achieve conservation. 
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This conclusion has a direct bearing on Bruner•s 
interpretation of the origin of the child's difficulties in 
applying ordering principles to t-he re-organization of a 
double classification matrix (Bruner and Kenney, 1966). 
He suggests that the language that children at the iconic 
level bring to bear on the task is insufficient as a tool 
of ordering and proposes that improvement in language would 
aid this type of problem solving. 
Agreement between the Harvard and Genevan projects 
regarding the link between the precise use of syntactical 
structures and the advent of the first operational structures 
has been reached, but completely different conclusions have 
been drawn regarding the source of this parallelism. 
Piaget's associates take the theoretical ~tandpoint, arising 
from research on verbal learning of conservation, th_at correct 
linguistic behaviour depends on operational structures and 
not vice versa: 
"Language learning does not provide, in our 
opinion, a ready-made "lattice" or lens 
which organizes the child's perceptual world• 
Rather, the lattice is constructed in the 
process of the development of intelligence, 
i.e., through the actions of the child on the 
environment and the interiorization of these 
actions to form operational structures". 
(Inhelder et al, op. cit. p •. 163). 
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It is acknowledged however, that language plays a role in the 
refinements of the "lattice" and there is a possibility of 
the feedback of language on operational structures, 
particularly at the formal stage. 
The efficacy of verbal training procedures remains 
a contentious issue. Ervin (1960), Wohlwill (1960) and 
Beilin (1965) demonstrate the limitations of verbal training· 
and question the role of verbal mediation in logical thought, 
although the approach of Braine and Shanks ( 1965) aimed at .. 
enhancing the child's differentiation between appearance and 
reality at a linguistic level on conservation tasks gives 
expression to the opposite view. Morf (1959, reported by 
Pinard and Laurendeau, 1969), working with children at an 
intermediate level between concrete and £ormal. operations, 
administered problems of implication and disjunction. He 
analysed the spontaneous solutions of the subjects and then 
furnished them with verbal information by repeating questions 
with supplementary details. Only those subjects who had 
spontaneously succeeded in solving one .or other question by 
hypothetico-deductive methods were able to assimilate the 
meaning of the supplementary information and apply it to the 
solution of problems they had failed earlier. 
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Sigel et al (1966) reflect with some scepticism 
on reported experiments of verbal training. Until such 
experiments are presented in more detail and utilize stringent 
methodological procedures they will remain open to alternative 
interpretations, since it is not always.indisputable that 
verbalization per se is the operative factor. 
c.2( a) The effects of language-deprivation on the 
intellectual development of the deaf. 
Conflicting opinions concerning the language-thought 
relationship give r_ise to a query of the level to which 
intellectual development may proceed independently of the 
normal acquisition of language. Does a difference in 
cognitive structure exist between the hearing child and the child 
who, though normally equipped to develop symbolic behaviour, has 
grown up without being steeped in the verbal language of his 
society? Using a natural "deprivation" experiment, it becomes 
possible to investigate whether or not language deficiency 
leads to a serious and general deficiency in cognitive 
development. 
At present, the published reports on the cognitive 
status of deaf children present a large body of contradictory 
data. The great diversity in methods and questions underlying 
the many reports makes direct comparison between various studies 
difficult. 
19 
The deaf child has been subjected to considerable 
psychological scrutiny over the past sixty years, though 
investigations have been largely aimed at making global 
comparisons with hearing children (Ewing, 1957; Myklebust, 
1966; Pintner et al, 1941). In contrast, a growing volume 
of research is emerging, devoted to the effects of deafness 
on specific psychological processes. The most notable 
leaders of this work are Ol~ron in France and Furth· in 
America. 
In the area 0£ concept attainment Ol~ron (1962, 
reported in Furth, 1966b) recorded no sigpificant differences 
between deaf and hearing children between the ages 4 and 7 on 
learning tasks utilizing concepts of sameness and difference. 
Furth (196la) studied the discovery of the principles of 
sameness, symmetry and opposition, noting that on the first 
two concepts no appreciable difference was evident, while on 
opposition principles hearing children were superior at all 
age levels, 7 through 12. Furth argued that the constant use 
of o_pposites in verbal language gave hearing children an 
advantage over the deaf. Vincent ( 1957, reported in Furth, 
1966b) presented the task of discovering three different 
principles of sorting to deaf children aged 6 to 8 years and 
measured the transfer of these principles. Results showed 
the deaf children to be one year behind on the attainment and 
transfer of the concepts. Youniss and Furth (1967) assessed 
logical thinking by devising a series of symbol cards 
·containing logical symbols for affirmation, negation, 
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conjunction and exclusive disjunction. The deaf succeeded 
on symbol use, but showed marked retardation on symbol 
discovery in which subjects were required to take the 
initiative in discovering the meaning of logical symbols. 
Furth (1966a) has reported a series 0£ studies 
investigating the role of language in the development of 
thinking in which deaf subjects are presented with various 
problem solving tasks to assess the effects of the absence of 
long-term linguistic stimulation on the development of 
cognitive structures. With the progression of this series, 
increasing use of Piaget's developmental. system has been made, 
particularly in assessing the implications of the findings for 
cognitive theories. Arguing from the standpoint of Piaget's 
delineation of symbol functioning and operative thinking, 
Furth (1964, 1966a) administered conservation of weight and 
liquid tasks to profoundly deaf children to determine whether 
operative thinking would be present without contemporaneous 
linguistic support. The main conclusion of a quantative 
analysis of the data was that deaf subjects were on an average 
18 months behind the hearing control. Furth stated however, 
that a qualitative investigation of failures revealed that the 
deaf were closer to the correct solution than a mere summary 
of successes and failures would indicate. Darbyshire ·and 
Reeves'(l969) reported that the performance of hearing-
impaired children on conservation of number experiments was 
not significantly inferior. Bradshaw.(1964, reported in Ives, 
1970) carried out a study of inferential reasoning of size 
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relations, demonstrating that 8 year old deaf children were 
two years retarded on sequential tasks, but were equal to 
hearing children on the simultaneous operational task. 
The findings of these explorations into the 
performance of deaf children on Piaget's concrete operational 
tasks are more striking if it is considered that blind children 
are able to solve these tasks on the average four years later 
than a normal control (Hatwell, 1960, reported in Sinclair-de-
Zwart, op. cit.). The visual deficit of the blind retards the 
constitution and coordination of sensory-motor schemes. 
Hatwell (~.) reports that verbal acqu~sitions cannot 
compensate for such a retardation, and postulates the necessity 
for "action-learning" before blind children are able to reach 
an operational level comparable to that of the normal and deaf. ·· 
The levels achieved by deaf subjects in the 
experiments reviewed are consistently higher than those 
reported by other workers. Ol~ron and Herren (1961, reported 
in Furth, 1966b) reported a six year retardation of deaf 
children in comparison with a hearing group on conservation of 
weight and liquid tasks. Ol~ron concluded that Piaget's theory 
does not sufficiently emphasi.ze the role of language in the 
emergence of operative thinking, particularly in the sub-
ordination of the perceptual realm to symbolic or conceptual 
conditions. 
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Reviews of cognitive research with the deaf (Ives 
1967; Furth 1966b) reveal the focus of experimentation to 
be at the level of concret.e reasoning. A recent development 
in research concerning the language-cognition relation, has 
been the experimental investigation of thinking in deaf 
adolescents. A pioneering step in this field has been taken 
...... 
by Furth (1969, personal communication). Seven deaf . .. ,,.·. 
adolescent boys were observed on a series of tasks on which 
clear success would be considered symptomatic of formal 
operational thinking. The results presented a mixed picture, 
since no subject clearly succeeded on all tasks nor failed 
completely on all tasks. Considerable difficulty was 
experienced in determining by non-verbal methods whether 
formal operations had been reached. The tentative conclusion 
was that propositional thinking can develop at least to its 
primary formation without the support of linguistic competence. 
Darbyshire and Reeves (op. cit.) administered two Piaget-type 
logic.al thinking tasks to deaf and hearing adolescents. While 
reporting no significant inferiority of deaf children on the 
tests, the authors note a significant correlation between 
poor performance on one of these tasks and severity of hearing 
loss. 
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C.2(b) Limitations of previous research with the deaf. 
Studies of the cognitive development of the deaf 
do not present a unified picture. The methodoiogical 
deficiencies so prevalent in this area of research may be 
responsible for conflicting results. Problems related to the 
control and exclusion of language from the experimental 
situation are frequently not sufficiently taken into account 
by experimenters. Even if a task does not require a verbal 
response, high performance may depend on understanding 
complicated instructions and the ability to ask questions. 
Only recently have isolated researchers (Furth, 1964, Ol~ron 
and Herren, op. cit.), begun to take cognizance of the need 
to exclude language from the testing procedure and creatively 
adapt materials for non-verbal presentation. There is a 
marked lack of clear explanation in the literature as to the 
nature of the presentation of tasks. Frequently no details 
are given beyond the remark that test instructions were 
presented by "pantomimed, manual and verbal methods". The 
extent to which verbal communication is relied upon is not 
explicit. 
It is possible that discrepancies between the results 
of Furth (op. cit.) and Ol~ron and Herren (op. cit.) on 
conservation attainment of deaf children may in part be due to 
differing techniques of task presentation. It should be further 
cautioned that Ol~ron's results were obtained on samples where 
no check was made to assure that the s~bjects were congenitally 
or prelinguistically deaf. His results therefore need to be 
replicated with a carefully diagnosed population. 
Blank (1965) notes that in none of Furth's studies 
has he controlled for or report·ed the age at which the children 
first entered school. She questions .whether the deaf can 
a priori be considered·an adequate linguistically deficient 
control group, citing modern teaching practices for the deaf 
'-that emphasize e?J.rly language training. The different learning 
histories within a deaf group and between deaf and hearing 
children, due to the deaf child's complete lack or general 
impoverishment of auditory input,, should be acknowledged. 
Age of onset of deafness and severity of hearing loss are 
often omitted from research reports. Considerable difference 
in language proficiency may thus exist in any random sample 
of deaf children. 
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Ervin and Miller (1963) have cautioned that a great 
proportion of children with neurological disorders or 
emotional disturbances in a deaf sample may affect results. 
Myklebust (op. cit•) and Lenneberg (1967) report many more 
children with psychiatric problems among the deaf than among 
the hearing. Ives (1967) states that the majority of studies 
pay insufficient attention to the etiology of the hearing loss 
and disregard the possibility that a purely random sample of 
deaf children would probably contain a number with psycho-
neurological learning disorders. 
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The above critique indicates that, in order that 
studies analysing the intellectual development of deaf 
persons may make a significant contribution to the 
theoretical status of the influence of language on cognitive 
development; improvements over previous research in 
experimental design must be made. 
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D. LANGUAGE ACQUISITION BY THE DEAF CHILD. 
D.l. Contributions of contemporary psycholinguistics. 
The "new wave" in psycholinguistics (Chomsky, 1957~ 
1965; Katz, 1966; NcNeill, 1966) offers a transformational. 
or generative grammar which is an explicit description of a 
finite set of rules which can, in principle, generate an 
infinite numbe.r of grammatical sentences in its native 
·language. This description of rules, as they must be 
mastered by an idealized speaker-listener, is ref.erred to as 
linguistic' competence. A difference exists between linguistic 
competence and linguistic performance, which takes the form of 
distinguishing what a person knows about a language and his 
expression of this knowledge in talking and listening which 
operates under constraints such as memory limitations. A 
syntactical, phonological and semantic component are 
contained in the system of rules of a generative grammar. 
The syntactical component, which accounts for the creative 
aspect of language, consists of a base, which generates deep 
. structures according to certain rules. In addition to the 
recursive properties of the base, the syntactical component 
contains rules of transformation. 
Katz (op. cit.), using Chomsky's model of a 
language acquisition device that has internalized linguistic 
rules as its output and speech as its input, demonstrates 
conclusively that the input is far too impoverished to account 
in full for the ~hild's construction of the complex grammar of 
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his native language in a surprisingly short period of time. 
"Grammatical speech does not begin before 1.5 years of age; 
yet, as far as we can tell, acquisition is virtually complete 
by 3.5 or 4 years" (McNeill, op. cit., p. 22). 
In a later paper, McNeill ( 1968, p. 407) gives a 
more accurate version of the "rapid-acquisition" assertion: 
"In approximately 30 months, therefore, language is acquired, 
at least that part of it having to do with syntax". The 
accumulating evidence that children have a general capacity 
to acquire syntax, developing a complex grammar, in spite of 
the fact that only "scanty and unsystematic data are provided 
by parental speech" (McNeill, 1966), has led to postulations 
of a language acquisition device containing innate structures. 
Chomsky (1965, p. 58) emphasizes the important problem of 
developing a hypothesis about the "initial structure" that 
the child brings to language learning. Such a predisposition 
to acquire syntax, as described by current linguists, should 
be of vital interest to those concerned with the development 
of language in deaf children. Since this capacity i~ something 
that the child brings with him to the task of language acquisition, 
it can be assumed to be possessed also by deaf children. An 
examination of children's capacity to acquire language and a 
more detailed specification of the initial assumptions con-
cerning the nature of language that the child brings to 
language learning~ may elucid·ate ways in which to structure 
information available to the deaf child in order to take 
advantage of his predispositions to develop language. 
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The minor revolution in the field of language . 
development, resulting in an expos~ of the inadequacy of 
associationistic psychology in accoUnting for the structural 
complexity of the young child's language and the rapidity 
with which it is acquired, has left in its wake the need 
for a great deal of theory construction. This is reflected 
in the fact that theoretical writings have greatly out-
numbered research reports in this first phase of renewed 
interest in language development (Smith and Miller, 1966). 
Modern psycholinguistic.theory, striving £or "explanatory 
adequacy" (Chomsky, op. cit., p. 27) , seems to find no 
alternative but to introduce innate linguistic structures 
to account for the beginnings of language acquisition. 
Psycholinguists working within the Piagetian framework 
{e.g., Sinclair-de-Zwart, op. cit.) acknowledge the need for 
postulating a structural richness within the acquisition 
device, but attempt to account for this by considering 
acquisitions during the preverb~i sensory-motor period. 
Piaget and Inhelder ( 1969) have tentatively formulated a 
hypothesis concerning the existence of parallel mechanisms 
and parallel constructive processes in cognitive development 
and in the acquisition 0£ syntactic structures. They · 
postulate similarities between Chomsky's descriptions of 
deep structure (Chomsky, op. cit.) and Piaget's account of 
sensory-motor structure (Piaget, 1950): 
/ 
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"At the age of 18 months, before the infant 
can talk, he can order, temporally and spatially; 
he can classify in action, that is to say he can 
use a category of objects for the same action, or 
apply different action-patterns to one object; and 
he can relate objects to objects and actions to 
actions. The linguistic equivalents of these 
capacities are concatenation, categorization and 
function, where categorization means the major 
categories (noun phrase, verb phrase, etc.) and 
function the grammatical relation (subject-of, 
object-of, etc.). These are the main operations 
at the base of the syntactic component which 
characterizes a highly restricted set of 
elementary structures from which actual sentences 
are constructed by transformational rules". 
(Piaget and Inhelder, op. cit. P• 148) 
Inhelder, in discussion with McNeill at the conclusion of the 
paper (~.),emphasizing her point that language acquisition 
is based on cognitive developmental mechanisms and not the 
contrary, states that it is "no accident" that language 
acquisition should occur after sensory-motor intelligence has 
reached its final stage. .Piagetian and Chomskian psycho-· 
linguists agree that the child brings with him to the task of 
language acquisition a capacity to acquire syntax, but differ 
regarding the degree of innateness of this capacity. 
Addressing himself to the problem of defining the 
initial assumptions concerning the nature of language that the 
child brings to language learning, McNeill (op •. cit.) suggests 
that one aspect of the innate capacity to acquire language is 
an expectation of hierarchical structure, which the child looks 
for in parental speech. The child expects that in order for 
the meaning of two words to interact, they must belong to the 
same· sentence constituent. The model of language acquisition 
postulated is analogous to scientific hypothesis testing. 
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The child is thus credited with a general expectation of the basic 
granunatical relations, namely subject and predicate, verb and 
object, modifier and head, that he makes use of in formulating 
hypotheses about hierarchical structures. The child tests his 
hypotheses against his parents' speech. Frequently adults 
repeat the speech of small children, and in so doing, change the 
child's sentences into the nearest well-formed equivalent. This 
phenomenon has been termed "expansion" by Brown (1965). A 
situation close to controlled experimentation is thus created, 
in which the child is able. to test hypotheses against parent al 
speech. It seems reasonable to expect that the deaf child will 
possess a source of hypotheses comparable to those of the hearing 
child, since for both, hypotheses result from a capacity for 
language acquisi~ion rather than from language per se. It is 
the ability to test hypotheses against parental speech that the 
deaf child is deprived of. The problem in educating the deaf 
child therefore rests in getting the relevant information to him. 
Current psycholinguistic theory indicates that the role played 
by such information is the opposite to what has.been customarily 
assumed, since parental speech has been shown to be necessary for 
the testing of hypotheses rather than for the formulation of.them. 
A model for educating the deaf can be found in the expansion 
situation, that is, a situation in·which the child is given new 
information in a form that differs minimally from what he already 
knows and in which there is a maximal chance that such information 
is relevant to what the child wants to know. In order to secure 
the effectiveness of expansion-like instruction, the deaf child 
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should be introduced initially to "child language" as 
desc.ribed by Brown and Fraser ( 1963) : 
" ••• a deaf child's acquisition of linguistic 
competence would be faster if his first exposure 
to English took the form of nouns, verbs, and 
undifferentiated pivot classes, presented in 
sentences that are generated by simple 
hierarchical rules free of transformations" 
(McNeill, op.cit., p.31). 
The presentation of child language to the deaf would vastly 
simplify their testing of hypotheses. Children begin 
language acquisition with hypotheses derived from a general 
capacity to acquire language, therefore their early speech 
is likely to consist of little other than these universally 
derived hypotheses. 
The study of the syntax of sign language remains 
a task for some interested linguist, however it is possible 
that sign language is also dominated by the same universally 
derived hypotheses. The m.ain objection, among educators of 
the deaf, to signing has been that it does riot adhere to 
normal grammatical str.ucture, being 11 systematic neither in 
its structure nor its· meanings" (Lewis Report, 1968). Signs 
do not follow normal word sequence, symbols are lacking for 
certain parts of speech, and verbs are used less frequently 
than in spoken or written English and in uninflected form. 
The educational potential of the new Paget systematic sign 
language (Paget, 1968), which follows English syntactical 
·constructions, is being assessed. +++ 
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The possibility of a critical period for language 
acquisition (McNeill, 1966; Brown, 1965) reaching a peak 
at age two to four and declining steadily thereafter, makes 
it imperative that attempts to take advantage of the deaf 
child's capacity for language acquisition should be directed 
at this age level. 
The recent trends in developmental psycholinguistics 
discussed above, highlight the shortcomings of traditional 
methods of teaching language to the deaf which attempt to 
impose an adult grammar on the child in the initial stages 
of his education. Testimony to the failure of such methods 
can be found in the data of investigations of the languag~ 
comprehension of deaf children, adding impetus to Furth's 
( 1966a) remark that " ••• under our present educational 
system the vast majority of persons,. born deaf, do not 
acquire functional language competence, even after undergoing. 
years of intensive training" (p. 13, Furth's emphasis). 
+++ A pilot study in progress at the Glas9ow School for 
the Deaf since 1967, is comparing the progress of a 
small group of children exposed to the new Paget 
sign language with that of a group taught by purely 
·oral methods. (Reported in the Lewis Report, op. cit.). 
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D.2. Review of Studies of Deaf Children's Language. 
The grammars written by modern psycholinguists 
have been presented "as pictures of competence, as models 
of the ability to grasp the structural. patterns of sentences" 
(McNeill, op. cit., p.- 22). These models h?Ve led to new 
research objectives, for example, the study of successive 
stages or "pregramrnars" in the child's discovery of the 
specific rules that define linguistic competence in his 
native language. Within the new theoretical "paradigm" 
(Kuhn, 1969), mastery of the sequential ordering and 
syntactical modifications of words are recognized as more 
important aspects of linguistic knowledge than such 
variables as vocabulary size and sentence length. 
Investigations of deaf children's language have 
been dominated by quantifications of indices of performance, 
such as sentence length, and hence give little insight into 
the linguistic proficiency of the deaf. Heider and Heider 
(1940) _compared the compo~itions of 1,118 deaf and hearing 
children 8 to 17. The immaturity of the deaf subjects• 
performance was said to be most strikingly revealed by a 
measure of sentence length. Characteristic of the style of 
the deaf was the use of relatively rigid, unrelated language 
units. These results have been supported in subsequent 
studies by Myklebust (1966) and Simmons (1962). 
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Furth (1969, personal communication) considers that 
there is no ready test available which would quantify linguistic 
competence and suggests the comprehension of Grade IV reading 
material as a measure of implicit comprehension of linguistic 
structure. Wrightstone, Aronow and Moskowitz (1963) gathered 
data on the silent reading achievement of over 5,000 deaf 
pupils. Comprehension of Grade IV reading material is 
considered to require mastery of the basic structure of 
English (Furth, 1966a). Less than 10% of the total sample 
tested by Wrightstone et al reached such a level. A further 
comparison of these data with hearing norms indicated that 
between the ages of 10 and 16 the mean reading score of the 
deaf rose less than ope year. Myklebust (op. cit.), with a 
sample of 564 deaf, reports essentially the same results. 
The theoretical models and methods of a growing 
number of researchers (Brown, 1965; Braine, 1963; Miller 
and Ervin, 1964; Menyuk, 1963)~ attempting to construct 
grammars to describe linguistic competence, are providing 
techniques for the measurement of the development of control 
over language structure. The experimental applications of 
these techniques can be found in the work of Porter (1959), 
Brown and Berko (1960) and Woodward (1968). The test of control 
over language structure devised by Woodward (~) +++ 
represents one of the first endeavours to measure responses 
of the normally hearing and deaf to syntactic structure. 
+++ Woodward's Test formed part of the battery administered in 





THE PRESENT STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION. 
The broad aim of the present study is to empirically 
evaluate thinking in a linguistically deprived sample and present 
some theoretical implications which have a direct bearing on the 
role of language and its relation· to thinking behaviour. 
A .£'urther aim is to examine the implications.that 
can be derived from the findings for educational practices 
with deaf and hearing children. 
The possibility of separating the linguistic from 
the nonlinguistic component in Piaget's tasks was explored. 
Modifications made in the administration procedure of four 
Piaget-type tasks represent a contribution toward adapting 
cognitive tasks for non-verbal presentation, thereby improving 
their diagnostic validity with linguistically deprived ,groups. 
Deaf children participating in the study were 
selected according to a number of specific criteria which 
defined and classified deafness. Within the. framework of the 
present study, the "deaf child" refers to the profoundly deaf, 
who have lost their hearing before the age of eighteen months, 
some of whom underwent specialized language training for the 
first time after they had passed the critical phase for 
language acquisition. A more detailed specification of the 
selection criteria is presented in Section A.l. 
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The deaf experimental group, by virtue of language 
deprivation, will be significantly inferior to a 
hearing control group in all aspects of language 
comprehension and control over language structure, 
failing to achieve by adolescence the. average 
linguistic competence of a mature speaker of a 
language. 
On Piaget-type tasks, adapted for non-verb.al 
presentation, the performance of the deaf 
experimental group will not be significantly 
inferior to that of the normally hearing control 
group. 
The acquisition of formal operational structures . 
does not need as a prerequisite the average 
linguistic competence of a mature speaker of a 
language as measured by performance o~ two 
specified language tests. 
A minor hypothesis to be tested may be stated as 
There will be a positive and significant 
correlation for each group between the score 
for the Paragraph Meaning Test and the total 





The sample for the study consisted of twenty-six 
children, twelve constituting the deaf group and fourteen the 
hearing group. The deaf group comprised eleven boys and one 
girl, the hearing control group thirteen boys and one girl. 
The ratio of boys to girls was determined by the availability 
of deaf subjects (ss) meeting the criteria of selection. 
Ten of the deaf children were enrolled at St. Vincent's 
School for the Deaf in Johannesburg and two were pupils at 
the Dominican-Grimley School for the Deaf in Cape Town. 
The control group of children with normal auditory acuity 
was drawn from a co-educational secondary school in Cape 
Town. 
A pilot study was conducted in order to ascertain 
whether the non-verbal method of task presentation was f'ully 
comprehensible and adequate to cope with response situations 
that might arise during the administration procedure. Seven 
hearing Ss, four boys and three girls between the ages 14:0 
to 15:3 and one deaf boy aged 14:0 participated. The IQ 
range of the pilot sample was 100 to 126. Following the 
pilot study minor modifications in task administration 
procedure were made and will be discussed under the relevant 
tasks. The high percentage of task solutions at the formal 
operational level suggested that the age range should be 
lowered to between 13 years 0 mo~ths and 14 years 10 months. 
•. 
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It was hoped that this would allow for a more even 
distribution of solutions over the concrete and formal 
operational sub-stages. 
The hearing and deaf groups in the present study 
were matched on age and IQ by group means. The IQs were 
obtained on the Snijders-Oomen Non-verbal Intelligence 
Sc.ale which was administered by the experimenter (E) during 
the first testing session. Age and IQ data for the 











13:0 - 14:10 




·S.D. IQ Range 
101 - 117 
100 - 119 
All hearing Ss were scholastically at the Std. 6 
The deaf Ss were not such a unified group regarding 
educational achievement, one being in Std. 3, nine in Std. 5, 
one in Std. 6 and one in Std. 7. The fact that deaf children 
do not enter school at a uniform age and further that their 
curriculum must needs place special emphasis on language 
training prior to the fostering of more general skills, 
accounts for their lag in scholastic attainment. 
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Socio-economic data, collected in the form of 
father's occupational level, revealed no appreciable 
difference in socio-economic status between the experimental 
and control group. 
A global term such as "the deaf child" is most 
unsatisfactory without some frame of reference. The present 
study sought to define and classify deafness, fulfilling a 
number of important selection criteria in order to ensure 
that the sample represented an adequate language deprived 
population. Five basic factors were considered. 
( i) Degree of deafness. Severity of deafness was 
such ·as to preclude the normal development of language embracing 
auditory decoding and vocal encoding psycholinguistic skills. 
One half of the group had a 100 db. loss in both ears, the 
hearing loss of the remaining being greater than 77 db. in the 
better ear. The hearing losses were obtained from audiograms 
in the pupils' files kept by the schools. The hearing 
threshold level in decibels was calculated and the audiogram 
.plotted according to the 1964 ISO reference thesholds for all 
Ss except R.P. and J.O. for whom audiograms provided by the 
school did not state the basis on which the db. loss was 
calculated. In all cases the hearing loss was obtained from 
the pupil's most recent audiogram. Since hearing tests are 
regularly administered, all audiograms were dated post 1966. 
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(ii) Age of onset. Information obtained from the 
school files of Ss stated that deafness was presumed congenital 
in the case of ten of the Ss selected. The remaining two 
became deaf before the age of eighteen months, that is, prior 
to the onset of language acquisition, specifically that part 
of it having to do with syntactic development (McNeill, 1966, 
1968). Children with progressive deafness were excluded from 
the sample. 
(iii) Etiology of hearing loss. The cause of 
de9fness appeared to be hereditary in the case of four Ss; 
deafness followed otitis media in one, and resulted from 
rhesus incompatibility in another. The cause of deafness 
was unknown for the remaining half of the sample. Ives (1967) 
st ates that deaf children presenting psychoneurolo9ical learning 
disorders in which a minimal disorder of the brain markedly 
affects a specific type of learning (Eisenson, 1966) often 
have histories of anoxia, rhesus incompatibility, encephalitis; 
meningitis· or maternal rubella. Ives (op cit.) brands as 
"unsophisticated11 studies that do not take into account 
etiological factors, however the high percentage of cases in 
schools for the deaf in which cause of deafness is stated as 
"unknown" (Backer, 1964; Myklebust, 1966) makes this requirement, 
from a practical viewpoint, difficult to fulfil. In cases where 
minimal brain dysfunctiort was suspected by the class teacher, 
children were excluded from the sample. 
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(iv) Age on first admission to school. The age 
at which Ss first received specialised language training 
ranged from 2 years 6 months to 7 years 4 months. In the 
case of two Ss the age at which they were first admitted to 
a school was unknown, however both had been enrolled at a 
school for the physically handicapped, which had no 
specialised teaching facilities for the deaf, until three 
years prior to the present study when they were transferred 
to a school for the deaf. Four of the ten Ss for whom age 
data concerning first nursery enrolment were avpilable, had 
passed the critical period for language acquisition (Brown, 
1965; McNeill, 1966). Speaking of the transitory nature 
of the capacity to acquire language, McNeill (ibid.) cautions 
that efforts to train the deaf child linguistic ally, tha.t are 
instigated after the age of four years, may meet with little 
success. 
( v) No secondary phy.sical defect or abnormality 
nor any obvious accompanying behavioural or emotional problems 
were present in children constituting the sample. Teachers 
at the school for the deaf from which.ten Ss wete drawn made 
use of a behavioural check list of personality traits, 
adjustment problems and deviate habits. In the remaining 
cases the principal's judgement was relied upon concerning 
this matter. 
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Data on which the selection was based are tabl~d below. 
Table 2 
SOME SELECTION DATA OF DEAF GROUP 
Subject Age of onset Etiology of Db. Loss Age on first Deafness School Admis. 
s.v. Congen. Familial 100,100,100 3:1 
D.H. Cong en. Unknown 100,100,100 3:5 
A.J. Congen. Unknown 100,100,100 3:3 
s.w. Cong en. Familial 100,100,100 2:6 
J.U. Congen. Unknown 100,97,97 3:0 
A.E. Congen. Familial 97,99,98 4: 8 
A.B. Congen. Familial 100,100,100 4:3 
A.M. Congen. Unknown 100,100,100 7:4 
K. iY. Congen. Unknown 100,99,99 
L.P. 6 months Otitis Media 84,100,87 
R.P. 18 months Unknown 88,78,83 5:0 
J.O. Cong en. RH Factor 87, 77, 82 2:6 
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General Procedure 
Each S participated in three testing sessions of 
varying length. The same E tested all Ss. Tests were 
administered in a fixed order and by standard non-verbal 
methods to the deaf and hearing group. Testing took place in 
individual sessions with the exception of the lqnguage test~, 
which were administered to Ss in pairs. 
At the first session hearing Ss were introduced to 
the non-verbal testing method, being cautioned to carefully 
observe the introductory materials presented with each task, 
since they served as preparation for the final problems. The 
deaf responded naturaliy and spontaneously to instructions 
presented non-verbally. 
In order to establish rapport with the deaf, E 
asked some questions assumed to be familiar to s, such as, 
"How old are you?", "Who is y01 . .1:r teacher?". The speech of 
almost all deaf Ss was extremely difficult to comprehend and 
their ability to lipread varied, however, the answers to these 
questions had already been made available to E in the 
preliminary information collected for sample selection purposes. 
This introductory "conversation" made Ss feel able to 




THE SNIJDERS-OOMEN NON-VERBAL INTELLIGENCE SCALE 
The P-Scale of the S.O.N. Scale was administered to 
the deaf and hearing Ss participating in the present study as 
a screening procedure, in compliance with the selection 
criterion requiring that Ss fall within the intelligence 
quotient range of 100 to 120. The Scale was administered in 
individual sessions lasting approximately one hour. 
The S.O.N. Scale was standardised in Holland in the 
early 1950s by J. Th. Snijders and N. Snijders-Oomen on 1,400 
hearing and 1,054 deaf-mute Ss between the ages of 3 and 16 
years. Further investigations in Belgium and Germany 
(Formesyn and Mammitzsch, et al, reported in Snijders, 1968) 
suggested that the materials and method of administration were 
as equally adaptable to Belgian and Germ.an Ss as to the Dutch. 
No significant differences in results were found in the three 
countries. A preliminary examination of the use of the Dutch 
Scale· in England and Scotland. (Gaskill et al, 1970) has - . 
provided similar promising results. The Dutch Form of the 
s.o.N. Scale' has been standardised in South Africa on 470 
children between the ages of 5 to 17 years in 4White schools 
for the Deaf (Backer, 1964). The sample comprised an 
impressive 68% of the total deaf population in that age range 
in White schools for the deaf. The S .O.N. Scale is the only 
intelligence scale for deaf children that has been standardised 
in South Africa and was therefore considered a more reliable 
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and valid measure of intelligence than many of the tests 
traditionally used in studies of the deaf child's intelligence; 
for example, Raven's Progressive Matrices (1960), Arthur Point 
Scale of Performance Tests (1947), Hiskey-Nebraska Test of 
Learning Aptitude (1966). The Performance Scale of the 
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (1949) is considered 
by Ives (1970) to be the most frequently used non-verbal test 
in research with deaf children (Murphy, 1957; Myklebust, 
1966; Evans, 1966; Pickles, 1966), however standardised 
pantomimed instructions are not available. 
Materials, Procedure and Scoring 
The S.O.N. Scale is entirely non-verbal and can be 
administered and performed without the use of spoken or 
written language. In addition to the non-verbal instructions, 
a set of verbal instructions that may be used with hearing 
children is presented in the Snijders-Oomen Manual (1968). 
The present study employed only non-verbal instructions with 
both deaf and hearing Ss. It was hoped that adherence to a 
non-verbal procedure would familiarise the hearing group with 
pantomimed instructions, since this technique was to be 
employed throughout the three testing sessions. 
The s.o.N. Scale consists of.eight sub-tests paired 
to form four test groups assessing Form, Combination, 
Abstraction and Memory. There are two parallel scales of 
£our sub-tests, entitled P and Q, either scale being sufficient 
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for an IQ assessment. The P-Scale should preferably be used 
with children aged 12 years and older, since this Scale. has 
the "higher reliability" (Snijders-Oomen, 1968; Backer, 1964) 
of the two Scales as far as the higher age groups are concerned. 
The P-Scale is most favoured in research for this reason 
{Gaskill, op. cit.) and was used in the present study. A brie£ 
description of the sub-tests comprising the P-Scale will · 
illustrate the rationale underlying their construction~ 
FORM: Block Design. . On each of the six sides of the blocks 
is a different configuration of red and white. Patterns are 
constructed from these blocks, reproducing an illustrated 
pattern. The analysis and synthesis of £orm is tested. 
Speed is a criterion of performance has been excluded from all 
except this sub-test. 
COMBINATION: Picture Series. Eighteen groups of cards are 
required to be sorted and laid in logical sequence. This is 
a test of the understanding of relations which are neither 
purely spatial nor completely abstract, but have a concrete 
meaning. Later items require comprehension of relations 
between participants in intricate situations. 
ABSTRACTION: Figure Analogies. ·A principle of arrangement 
must be abstracted from material presented and then applied 
to new materials. Abstract figures are used. 
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MEMORY: Picture Memory. Pictures 0£ objects and geometric 
shapes are exposed for a few seconds, a£ter which they must 
be identified on a large card containing a greater number 0£ 
pictures. 
The sub-tests of the s.o.N. Scale are attractively 
designed and proved interesting to the testees. The dea£ 
child is a careful observer of gesture and facial expression. 
E therefore had to guard against suggesting answers through 
facial expressions and hand movements. Dea£ children are 
apt to be very dependent and needed much encouragement and 
accentuated approval in the test situation. All dea£ Ss 
had been tested on the S.O.N. Scale at least 3 to 4 years 
prior to the present study. 
Raw scores were converted into scaled scores and 
subsequently into IQs according to the tables in the annexure 
of the Manual {Backer, op. cit.) £or deaf' Ss and tables 
provided by Snijders-Oomen (op. cit.) £or hearing Ss. 
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Second Session 
PARAGRAPH MEANING TEST 
The Paragraph Meaning Test of the Silent Reading 
Tests (Revised Edition, 1963), Junior-Form A, distributed by 
the National Bureau of Educational and Social Research, was 
administered. During the same testing session, after a 10 
minute interval, Woodward's Nonsense Test of Structural Meaning 
(1963, 1968) was administered. The total duration of the 
session was approximately one and a half hours. Both these 
tests are intended to be administered as_ group tests, however, 
in the present study Ss were tested in pairs. This procedure 
was introduced in view of a qualitative assessment of the 
behaviour of the deaf child participating in the pilot study. 
It is an established fact that deaf children are very 
dependent (Myklebust, 1966; Snijders, 1968), needing sustained 
attention and reassurance. Certain modifications in the 
administration procedure of the Paragraph Meaning Test also 
made it imperative that Ss should be seen in pairs. 
Research into the cognitive abilities of deaf persons, 
which aims to contribute to the theoretical stat~s of the 
relationship of language and thought, has traditionally used 
silent reading achievement tests where an attempt has been made 
to quantify the retardation in language development of the deaf 
(Furth, 1966 a). In the present study the additional use of 
the more contemporary approach of Woodward (1968), using the 
psycholinguistic method, must be .considered a pilot application 
in the area of language-thought research. 
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The Paragraph Meaning Test administered in the 
/present study, is primarily concerned with measuring Ss' 
comprehension of the theme of a paragraph; ability to 
determine the meanings of words from their context; comprehension 
0£ figures of speech, the writer's aim and viewpoint and the 
emotional tone of the paragraph. - Ability to answer questions 
on details specifically mentioned in the paragraph as well as 
ability to draw conclusions about what is implied rather than 
stated, are tested (Manual, 1963) • 
Materials, Procedure and Scoring 
The paragraphs are graded in order of difficulty and 
include a variety of subject matter. The test consists of 29 
five choice items, the first 4 being practice examples. A 
separate answer sheet on which the testee is required to make 
a mark opposite the right number in the relevant section, 
accompanies the Revised Edition of the Silent Reading Tests. 
This answer sheet was not used with deaf or hearing Ss because 
of the obvious difficulties involved in imparting the 
instructions for its use to the deaf. The administration 
procedure was modified to allow Ss to circle the correct 
answer directly in the test booklet. Instructions were 
presented on a chart, which provided a br~ef explanation of 
the purpose of the test and emphasised that Ss should not 
spend too much time on questions they could not do. E sat 
between the two Ss in order to work through the practice 
examples with them, ensuring that they understood how the 
questions should be answered. The prescribed testing time of · 
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24 minutes was adhered to. Raw scores were obtained and 
reading ages determined from the table of norms provided in 
the Manual (op.cit.). 
WOODWARD'S NONSENSE TEST OF STRUCTURAL MEANING 
• 
Woodward (1963, 1968) has devised a test of the 
structural component of linguistic meaning divorced from the 
lexical component, employing structural signals described by 
Fries (1952). Using a paper and pencil technique to measure 
response to language structure, the test was initially 
administered by Woodward to groups of normally hearing and 
deaf children 13 to 15 years. The test uses a nonsense-word 
technique to eliminate lexical clues to meaning. The profoundly 
deaf child, markedly retarded in vocabulary development 
(Gaskill, 1957, reported in Ives 1970) is thus not penalised 
over his hearing counterpart in this respect. The Nonsense 
Test consists of nonsense words used in sentences and short 
sentence sequences wherever words belonging to the form-classes 
described by Fries (op. cit.) would ordinarily occur. Fries has 
summarised the devices by which the more important structural 
meanings are conveyed to the average mature speaker of English, 
namely those that signal sentence kinds, direction of reference 
in sentence sequences, part-of-speech membership, meanings 
carried by subjects and objects and meanings carried by modifiers. 
Ss are required to respond in a variety of ways designed to ~est 
their absorption of the meaning conveyed by these structural 
signals. Meanings carried by word arrangement and by function 
words are thoroughly explored. 
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The Nonsense Test was originally designed to explore 
relations between response to structural clues to meaning and 
reading ability in normally hearing. and deaf children. 
Woodward (1963) proposes that the Nonsense Test be used as a 
diagnostic tool to probe weaknesses in comprehension of sentence 
structure, considered the most important aspect of linguistic 
competence by modern developmental psycholinguists (see p.33). 
In view of the inferiority of the deaf as compared with the 
normally hearing in comprehending meaning conveyed by syntactic 
structure, Woodward (ibid.) recommends that language instruction 
of the deaf should emphasise meaning carried by sentence 
structure. The vocabulary lag of the deaf is so conspicuous 
that it overshadows the equally crippling deficiencies in 
ability to interpret complex sentence structure(~., p. 32). 
Teaching of lexical meaning to the deaf has thus traditionally 
been engaged in to the neglect of meaning carried by structure • 
• 
Materials, Procedure and Scoring 
The Nonsense Test was administered in a standard way 
to both dea±: and hearing Ss. Introductory information explaining 
the nature of the test was presented in written form on a large 
chart. This procedure differed from that used by Woodward 
(.~.),who introduced the tasks verbally. Woodward does not 
report the degree of hearing loss of her deaf Ss •. All Ss 
participating in the present study were profoundly deaf (See 
~able 2) and since difficulty in lipreading is associated with 
severity of hearing loss (Moore.s, 1969), it was decided to 
adhere strictly to written rather than spoken language. The 
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introductory chart contained the following information: 
This is a new kind of reading test. 
Most of the words in it are not real 
words, but make-believe or nonsense 
words. I want to see how well you can 
understand sentences when the·words ar~ 
make-believe. · 
Let us try to understand a sentence 
of make-believe words. 
Woggles ugged. 
Who ugged? 
What did Woggles do? 
Since the pilot study had revealed that the deaf needed a 
great deal of reassurance that the words presented were indeed 
make-believe or nonsense words, E went over the contents of the 
chart thoroughly, running a pointer under the lines, to ensure 
that Ss grasped the idea that they could indeed read and 
understand the sentence, even though they did not know what 
Woggles or ugged meant. 
The test consists of six sections. Directions.for 
each section and the sample item used in explaining the task 
are given below. These directions were displayed on large charts, 
the relevant chart being displayed and worked through before 
commencing each new section. 
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Part I - Sentence Recognition* 
Use capital letters, periods, and question marks in 
the following, to show where the sentences begin and end. 
Example: 
a munchment sapled lan did he borgle it. 
Part II - Sequence Signals 
The sentences in the following groups can be arranged 
to make a story. Put a number after each sentence to show the 
order in which it should come to make a story. 
Example: 
The hort sunged. 
Pog abbed a gork. 
Then the surbles bonched grosply. 
Part III - Sentence Kinds* 
Tell whether each of the following sentences is a 
question, statement, or command. 
Example: 
( 
Is the fresner storp 
Hoble the frisp gantly 
Rarely had the barg norged 
*In the sections marked with an asterisk, supple~entary 
information had to be provided, since the pilot study 
indicated that some of the terms used were not familiar to 
the deaf child, even-though the concept was known. The 
advice of a teacher of the deaf was taken in this respect. 
Woodward's sample were apparently able to comprehend the 
instructions without additional assistance. 
.• 
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Part IV - Parts of Speech 
Read the following sentences.. What do the underlined 
words mean? Draw a circle around the meaning you think is right. 
Example: 
The garble sonned frumptiously. 
(lonely, angrily, frightened) 
Part V - Subjects and Objects 
Read each sentence or group of sentences. Then 
read the questions about it. Draw lines under the right 
answers. 
Example: 
The rog was £ranted by the purnip. 
(a) Who £ranted something? 
(the reg, the purnip, yes) 
(b) Did the reg do anything in t~is·sentence? 
(Yes, No, We don't know) 
(c) What does "franted" mean? 
(pushed, fussy, frowned) 
(d) What does this sentence tell us? 
What happened to the purnip 
What happened to the rog 
What the reg found 
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Part VI - Modifiers 
Read the sentence and write short answers to the 
questions about it. 
Example: 
A burbling £angle gobbed randly into the £orstant. 
(a) What kind 0£ £angle did something? 
(b) How did the £angle gob? 
( c) What is the verb in this se~tence? 
( d) What was the £angle doing when it went into the 
£orstant? 
E indicated the correct answers to the sample items 
with a pointer and wrote them on a blackboard. Ss were 
encouraged by gesture to indicate the correct answer on·the 
chart displayed. The chart containing the sample item and 
solutions of a particular test section was displayed within 
S's view while he was completing that section. This enabled 
S to refer freely to the sample items while the test was in 
progress. The test was not timed. The scoring criteria 
0£ Woodward (ibid.) were adhered to. 
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Third Session 
. Tasks devised by Piaget and his associates, which 
elicit responses 'distinguishing Ss performing at the concrete 
operational level from those at the formal operational level, 
were considered with the view to eliminating or minimising 
transmission of instructions by language. Although verbal 
instructions and verbal responses are an integral part of 
Piaget's "clinical method", recent experimental procedures 
devised by Furth (1964) and Ol~ron and Herren (1961, reported 
in Furth 1966a) indicate that the essential requirements of 
certain tasks are non-verbal. The four tasks selected for 
the present study were amenable to modification for non-verbal 
presentatiC?n• Instructions were presented mainly by 
pictorial representation, occasionally being combined with 
written words. Responses in the form of actions ~ere required 
of Ss, thus verbal communication was eliminated from the 
administration procedure and from the response situation. 
The Piaget-type tasks were presented in the 
following order to all Ss; judgement of displac~d volume, 
probability concepts, combinations of chemical bodies and 
judgement and measure of equivalent three dimensional space. 
The length of the session varied according to Ss ability, 
the average duration being one and a half hours. 
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PROBABILI1Y CONCEPTS AND PROBABILISTIC RESPONSES 
The relevance of problems of chance to the study of 
formal _thought has been emphasised by Inhelder and Piaget 
(1958, p. 224). The vital general property of formal 
operational thought concerns the ~ versus the possible. 
The probability that an event will occur is contained in the 
relationship between the possible instances of an ·event and 
those which actually occur. The estimation of probability 
laws presupposes the existence of certain formal-operational 
schemata for the calculation of correlations or associations. · 
Tracing the development-of probability concepts 
from many experiments in this area, Piaget and Inhelder (1951) 
argue that cognitive processes must be sufficiently developed 
for ordering and organising the intrinsically certain, lawful 
and predictable by means of rational operations before things 
which are intrinsically uncertain, unlawful and unpredictable 
can be apprehended. The preoperational child manifests a 
generalised inability to differentiate between chance and 
nonchance• He is forever midstream between the deductively 
certain and the genuinely fortuitous. 
The advent of concrete operations marks the 
development of a distinction between the possible and the 
certain. The child recognises that in one domain he may know, 
yet in.another he can only guess. He has to move beyond 
separating chance from nonchance; he must rationally apply 
the so-called laws of probability to extract from the field 
of chance events what minimal certainty there is to be found there • 
• 
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The concrete operational child makes limited progress 
toward establishi~g probabilities in lieu of certainties. It 
requires the f'undamental reorientation toward cognitive 
problems which the period of formal operations brings, 
especially the advent of combinatorial and proportionality 
schemata, to systematically solve quantification-of-probability 
problems. For this reason, experiments involving the 
calculation of probabilities "yield developmental changes 
which extend well into adolescence" (Flavell, 1966, p. 342). 
The method used in the present study was adapted 
from the experimental design of Ross (1966). Ss were 
required to make predictions on a 2-choice probability 
concept task. This is a simplified version of Piaget and 
Inhelder's (1951) experiment in which children were.required 
to draw out pairs of counters from a bag containing unequal 
numbers of different coloured counters, (e.g., 15 yellow, 
10 green, 6 brown, 3 blue). The child was required to 
predict the colour composition of the two counters before 
each successive withdrawal. Simplification of this procedure 
allows for a detailed analysis of the effects of performing 
predictions sequentially, that is not practicable with 
3- or 4-choice problems. · 
... 
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Materials and Procedure 
S was seated at a table directly opposite a wooden 
box painted flat black, 9t" wide, 9-i" long and 7-i" deep. A 
jointed flap 3" x 3" was cut in the box on the long side • 
One blue and one red ball 2" in diameter were glued to a 
board placed slightly to the right of s. The requirements 
of the problem were that each child should observe a pre-
determined number of balls of two different colours being 
placed in the opaque box. S then indicated his prediction 
of the colour of the single ball he would draw from the box 
by pointing at one of the coloured balls on the board before 
him. He continued predicting and drawing out balls until 
the box was empty. . The flap on the side of the box enabled 
S to insert his hand and take out one ball .without being able 
to see inside the box. 
E placed the number of balls specified for a 
particular problem in front of S where he could see them. 
Ensuring that S•s attention was focused on the problem, E 
next placed the balls in the box one at a time, ~utting in 
all of one colour before putting in tho·se of the other colour. 
The order of colour placement was randomised from problem to 
problem. E then shook the box. It was indicated to S by 
g·esture that a ball was to be drawn from the box and his 
attention was then directed to the two alternatives, 
represented by the blue ball and red ball mounted on the board, 
that might be drawn. At this point, a card devised by E, 
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pictorially representing the alternative responses and their 
appropriateness was presented. (See Appendix p.118). The 
· card communicates by means of a picture sequence that it is 
desirable fo~ one's colour prediction to be confirmed by the 
withdrawal and undesirable if one's prediction and withdrawal 
do not correspond. Ross (op. cit.) conveyed this idea while 
the experiment was already in progress by nodding his head, 
affirmatively to indicate that S had been successful whenever 
the drawn ball agreed with S's predictions. At the initial 
explanatory stage however, Ross relied.to a great extent on 
verbal instruction. Reinforcement of S was not given on 
the basis of whether S made a prediction that was scored as 
objectively correct, since E nodded affirmatively when S's 
withdrawal confirmed his prediction. The prediction procedure 
continued until all balls were drawn out. Drawn balls were 
placed within the view of s.. Subsequent problems were 
administered in the same manner with S predicting before each 
withdrawal. 
The situation demanded neither the use nor under-
standing of probabilistic terminology. The confounding of 
probability capacities and associated verbal abilities in the 
procedures used by Piaget and Inhelder (op. cit.) in studying 
the development of chance concepts has been criticised by 
Yost, Siegel and McMichael (1961) and Braine (1968). 
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The order 0£ the 10 problems administered to each 
S, in terms of the number 0£ balls placed in the box at the 
beginning of a problem was as follows, with R = Red balls and 
B = Blue balls. 
l. 3R-3B 2. 2R-4B 3. 4R-4B 4. 6R-3B 5. lR-lB 
6. 3R-4B 7. 2R-2B 8. 3R-2B 9. 6R-4B 10. 1R...;3B 
Scoring Criteria 
Three different types of choice situations were 
encountered by Ss on the wide range of probability values 
administered. Firstly "uneven odds" choices occurred whenever 
S was faced with an uneven number of balls of different colours. 
Pr~dictions with uneven odds are probabilistic, since the more 
probable and hence the correct prediction is always the 
majority colour. Developmental studies of probability 
concepts have concluded that Ss are more sensitive to small 
departures from even odds with increasing age and show a growing 
mastery of probability principles along the general lines 
indicated by Piaget's research (Fire 1958, reported in Flavell, 
op.cit; Ross op;cit; Stevenson and Zigler, 1958). Secondly, 
"sure thing" choices occurred on the last trial or trials of 
a problem when ball(s) of only one colour remained. If S 
failed consisten.tly on "sure thing" predictions, this would 
indicate that he had not mastered the skill of keeping track 
of events in_ sequence. Thirdly, "even odds" choices occurred 







At the concrete-operational stage S begins to try 
to quantify prob~bilities, but fails to do so itj a systematic 
manner. He is able to ~a.k.e objectively correct predictions 
when faced with uneven.odds choices, however he tends to forget 
that each drawing changes the frequency of the balls remaining 
in the box and so fails to keep his probabilistic estimates up 
to date as he goes along (Piaget and Inhelder, op.cit.). These 
Ss can therefore be expected to sometimes make errors in the 
terminally occurring "sure thing" predictions. Ss with 
between 60% and 79% of their predictions in favour of greater 
odds were classified in the initial sub-stage of concrete 
operations. Between Bert and 89% predictions according to 
greater odds indicated performance at the equilibrium sub-
stage of concrete operations. 
In accordance with the rating criteria of Furthr 
(1969, personal conununication), Ss were considered to.have 
reached the initial sub-stage of formal operations if over 
90"t of their predictions were according to greater odds. 
The technique used in the present study to elicit 
probabilistic responses did not lend itself to ~ detailed 
analysis of reasoning in terms of proportions and possible 
combinations. The present task of responding f1ppropriately 
to the changing odds of balls of two colours and predicting 
probabilistic events accordingly does not allow for as clear 
a theoretical distinction between concrete and formal level 
responses as does Piaget's (op.cit.) problem of drawing pairs 
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or trios of elements from collections containing several 
varieties of objects according to a speci£ied numerical 
distribution. In Piaget's procedure, however, the 
probabilistic terminology the child is required to 
comprehend is £ormidable. 
THE CONSERVATION OF VOLUME 
The major finding of Piaget and Inhelder•s (1941) 
systematic study of the child's grasp of quantity notions has 
been that discoveries of conservation follow a regular order 
that is related to age. Conservation of ma:tter is commonly 
discovered at 8 to 10 years of age, of weight at 10 to 12 
years, and of volume only at 12 years and after. Piaget's 
theoretical interpretation of this finding is complex and 
detailed. The first concrete operational schema contributing 
to the acquisition of matter conservation is embodied in the 
general capacity to multiply relations. - The conservation of 
matter will be achieved by the child who, when considering a 
ball of clay trans£ormed into a sausage, notices both length 
and thickness changes and comprehends that what the clay has 
gained in length it has lost in thickness, the total quantity 
thus remaining invariant. Atomism, the second schema, invo~ves 
a conception 0£ the clay as a whole composed of units which 
change their location vis-a-vis one another when the whole 
undergoes a trans£ormation 0£ shape. An understanding that 
the total sum of these parts remains constant, whatever their 
spatial distribution, is expressed in the conservation of 
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matter (Flavell, op. cit.). The ~ossession 0£ these schemata 
/ 
does not immediately result in an extension of invariance 0£ 
matter to that of weight and volume. An obstacle to the 
conse vation of weight may be posed by S's belief that though 
the otal number of units of clay remain the same, the weight 
of each unit varies with its location in the whole. 
Experimental data dealing with the development of concepti6ns 
of density and compression - decompression have illuminated 
the problems responsible for the late achievement of 
conservation 0£ volume (Piaget and Inhelder, op. cit.). 
Piaget states that non-conservation 0£ volume, where 
conservation of matter and weight have been attained, results 
from an implicit belief that each unit of clay varies in the 
amount of space it occupies, compresses anp decompresses and 
alters in its density as a function of its position in space 
following transformation of the whole (~. PP• 65 - 66, 
reported in Flavell, op. cit.). Establishment of the concept 
of volume and of its relation to weight requires the develop-
ment of a schema of substance density and related concepts· 
concerning the compression and decompression of matter •. 
"Neither the conservation of volume nor, consequently, 
of density, is worked out in a systematic fashion before sub-
stage III - A (the initial stage of formal operations); 
however the conservation of weight and certain schemata 
preparatory to the concept of density are acquired at substage 
II - B (the upper level of concrete operations)" (Inhelder and 
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Piaget, 1958, P• 20). The problem of volume is for this reason 
appropriate for an analysis of the transition from concrete to 
formal thinking. The conservation o~ volume throughout changes 
of shape presupposes the ability to handle proportions expressed 
in multiplicative compensations. 
Two tasks investigating the concept of volume were 
included in the present study. The experimental method of the 
• first was adapted from the classic "conservation 0£ volume" study· 
by Piaget and Inhelder (1941), while the second, dealing with the 
judgement and measurement of equivalent three dimensional space 
followed a design similar to that of Piaget, Inhelder and 
Szeminska (1960). Important modifications in the administration 
procedure were devised in order to ensure that sufficient steps 
were taken to communicate all aspects of the problems by non-
verbal methods. 
VOLUME I: THE JUDGEMENT OF DISPLACED VOLUME 
Materials and Procedure 
In order to make instructions comprehensible to the deaf, 
E devised a series of cards pictorially representing the test 
materials in each step in the experimental procedure as well as 
the possible responses from which S coulq choose. These cards,• 
reduced in scale, appear in their correct order of presentation 
in the Appendix pp. 119 - 125). S was presented with two clay 
balls 2" in diameter, one blue, the other red. He was encouraged 
to hold the balls against one another to compare their size. It 
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was imparted by pantomime that he could pinch off or add clay 
/ 
to the balls to equalize them. Since the balls had been made 
to exact measurements, it rarely occurred that Ss actually 
altered the amount of clay composing a ball. The two balls were 
then placed on a scale balance to establish equivalence of weight. 
I 
The attention of S was drawn to 2 beakers, the water in each being l 
at precisely the same height. The equality of water level was 
pointed out. Occasional Ss in the deaf and hearing groups 
poured water back and forth between the beakers before they were 
satisfied that the level was equal. 
The blue ball was retained as a standard of comparison 
while the red ball was transformed. The various transformations 
that took place during the experiment involved changing the ball 
into four balls, a snake and a cylindrical shape, After each 
transformation, the standard blue ball was immersed in one of 
the beakers and the resultant rise in water level was pointed out. 
Pictorially represented alongside the beaker containing the 
standard ball was the transformed piece of clay immersed in a 
beaker, the water level of which was being queried by a number 
of question marks_. The transformed clay is of course never 
actually immersed in the. beaker of water. The pictures of the 
altered piece of clay under water represent an imagined immersion. 
Three cards representing the "possible" response$ were placed in 
a row before s. These pictures were intended as equivalent 
symbols of "same level", "lower" or "higher". The-original water 
level before the actual and imagined immersion was marked on the 
cards by a dotted line. The three cards representing the three 
response choices that followed each transformation were placed 
in a random order to ensure that the correct response, that is, 
the representation of the "same level", did not always appear 
in the same position in relation to the other alternatives. 
As well as indicating his choice on the cards before him S 
was invited by gesture to point out the level to which he 
anticipated the water would rise on the beaker. This repetition 
of choice was introduced to allow Ss giving hesitant responses 
an opportunity to reconsider their choice. The fact that some 
Ss in the pilot study returned to problems and corrected their 
responses seemed to indicate that a second assertion of S's 
response was advisable. 
A brass ball 211 in diameter was then introduced.and 
displayed next to the blue ball. S was again encouraged to 
compare the size of the two balls and make addition or subtraction 
adjustments to the clay ball should he consider that the balls were 
not the same size. The brass and clay balls were then placed in 
S's hands. The difference in weight was obvious and the · 
comparative heaviness of the brass ball was immediately apparent 
to all Ss. The balls were also placed on the scale, the heavy 
brass ball causing the scale to tip sharply. No alternation of 
shape was made and the blue ball was iinmersed. Prior to this 
immersion the attention of S had been dravi.n to the equality of 
water level in the two beakers. The height to which the water 
level would rise should the brass ball be placed in the remaining 
beaker was then queried by a picture card, followed by pictures 
of the three alternative responses. The final transformation 
68 
took the form of altering the blue ball to a snake-like form 
and immersing the brass ball, S being expected ~o predict the 
water level on the other beaker should the snake be immersed. 
Scoring Criteria 
At the initial sub-stage of concrete operations 
conservation of occupied or displaced volume is not 
systematically achieved. ·Modification of form entails 
variation in surface area and since at this sub-stage S has 
not yet established the correct relations between the space 
which is contained and the areas which bound it, he will not 
conserve volume in a situation of maximal perceptual pull. 
S therefore would not systematically antici~ate equality of 
water level if the standard ball of clay and transformed clay 
were to be immersed. A number of hearing Ss at this sub-stage 
while making their response choice from the cards, spontaneously 
offered explanations to the effect that the weight ·of the clay 
and its density altered as a consequence of the tr_ansformation. 
Response to the introduction of the heavy ball further 
indicates that S attributes the displacement of water to the 
weight of the immersed body rather than to its volume. 
The equilibrium sub-stage of concrete operations is 
marked by the systematic conservation of displaced volume in 
all cases with the exception of the heavy ball. When confronted 
with the transformations into 4 balls, a ~nake and a cylinder, S 
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is able to shield himself from the "bias of perceptual 
immediacy" (Bruner ~' 1966). Though the surface areas 
are variable, S understands that displaced volume remains 
. 
constant in such transformations. He remains in a transition 
stage however, since he too lacks a schema of substance 
density, failing to grasp the concept of volume and its 
relation to weight. At this point, weight and volume are not 
yet separable rational concepts and are thus not seen as 
. distinct properties which can vary independently. The 
weight of the heavy ball is considered responsible for 
"pushing the water up", a notion which a few of the hearing 
and deaf Ss spontaneously verbalized. 
The major accomplishment of the initial sub-stage of 
formal operations with respect to the problem of judging 
displaced volume is a recognition of the logica). independence 
of volume and weight resulting from a genuine quantification 
of both. Displaced volume is conserved ~hrough all 
transformations in the series including those steps in which 
the heavy brass ball is introduced. A concept of density, 
for which formal operational schematization is needed 
(Inhelder and Piaget, 1958, P• 36), is achieved. The 
transitivity principle,as it applies to equal and unequal· 
weights and volumes would be recognized b~ Ss at this 
sub-stage. 
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VOLUME 2: THE JUDGEMENT AND MEASUREMENT OF EQUIVALENT 
THREE DIMENSIONAL SPACE 
Materials and Procedure 
s, seated at a table next to E, was shown a solid 
brass block measuring 4 cm. in height against a square base 
3 cm. x. 3 cm., its volume being 3.6 cm~ One hundred brass 
cubes, each measuring 1 cm. were scattered around the solid 
block. In a quick movement, E placed 3 cubes along the base 
0£ the solid block and piled £our cubes on top 0£ one another 
against the solid. These blocks were immediately removed 
from their position against the solid and placed again among 
the scattered cubes. The procedure 0£ briefly placing the 
cubes against the solid was introduced in order to indicate 
non-verbally to S that it· was permissible to manipulat·e the 
blocks freely and measure them against the solid block should 
he wish. A pilot application of this test had revealed that 
the hearing child at an advan~ed level commonly asked whether 
he was pennitted to measure the surfaces of the solid block 
with the 1 cm. cubes, while the-deaf child experienced 
difficulty in formulating this question and consequently could 
not ascertain that this was permitted. The <lea£ S could thus 
have been placed at a considerable disadvantage to the hearing 
s. .-. 
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A series of explanatory cards, devised by E 
(See Appendix, PP• 126 - 130) was presented to S to indicate 
the problem, namely reproducing the volume of the solid block 
with the little cubes while altering its form to comply with 
the base given. These cards utilise pictures and words to 
clarify the problem. It should be appreciated that the 
scale has been greatly reduced to accommodate the cards in 
the Appendix. -A description of the presentation of these 
cards and the supplementary actions accompanying this 
presentation will illuminate the extent to which reliance on 
written instructions was minimised. 
The first card displays two islands, one being 
double the area of the other. One is labelled "their island" 
the other "our island". Card 2 shows that both islands have 
been built upon, yet in spite of the differences in size, both 
buildings have 11 the same amount of space inside". The 
picture clearly indicates that the house on the larger base is 
made of two blocks alongside one another, while the house on 
the smaller base is constructed from the same number of blocks 
of equal size, one being placed on top of the other to 
compensate for the smaller area of the island. Two bases, 
one measuring l cm. by 2 cm., the other being 1 cm. square, 
painted on a background of sea are depicted on Card 3. E 
placed two cubes one adjoining the other on the 1 x 2 cm. 
base and two cubes one on top of the other on the 1 x 1 cm. 
base, pointing respectively to the words "They build a house" 
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and "ours has the same amount of space inside" on Card 2. 
Card 3, on which the cubes had been placed, was left on display, 
while Card 4 was produced. The building on the larger base is 
depicted in Card 4 as having doubled in size and is accompanied 
by the words "They make theirs bigger". The building on the 
1 x 2 cm. base on Card 3 is correspondingly enlarged. The 
building on the smaller base is depicted as extending upwards. 
An incomplete storey on which have been placed question marks 
indicates that the extent to which the building must rise in 
order to have the "same amount of space inside" as its 
neighbour is being queried. S was then invited by gesture 
to complete the building on the 1 x 1 cm. base on Card 3 
while his attention was being drawn to the words "same amount 
of space inside" on Card 4. All Ss were able to complete the 
buiiding by placing two blocks 9ne above the other, making the 
building a total of 4 blocks in height. The building on the 
1 x 1 base therefore compensated in height for what it lacked 
in breadth. E then emphasised the numerical correspondence in 
the blocks composing the two buildings, the 1 x 2 cm. base 
having 4 blocks, two covering the base and two forming a 
second storey; and the 1 x 1 cm. base having 4 blocks placed 
one on top of the other. Ss attention was again drawn to the 
words "same amount of space inside". The designs were then 
broken up and Card 5, displaying "their new island" and "our 
new island", was presented. The areas of the two islands were 
again di££erent. Card 6 displaying on the left a base 3 x 3 
cm. and on the right a base 2 x 3 cm. suProunded by sea, was 
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placed next to Card 5. Card 7 was introduced showing that the 
bases of each "new island" as they appeared in Card 5 had been 
built upon. The building on the larger base on the left 0£ 
the card, a solid block, is accompanied by the words "They 
build a hotel". Ss attention was then drawn to the 3 x 3 on. 
·base on Card 6 on which was placed the solid 3 x 3 x 4 cm. 
brass block. Referring again to Card 7, E pointed to the 
incomplete building on the smaller base on the right, the 
question marks on the top of this building and the words 
"same amount of space inside". Turning to Card 6, E pointed 
to the· 2 x 3 cm. base and gestured that S should begin building, 
pointing as a reminder to the words "same amount of space 
inside". It should be noted that though the same technique 
of· demonstration as in the earlier cards was used, the buildings 
in Card 7 were not sub-divided into blocks. Such a division 
would emphasise arithmetical correspondence. S was then 
presented with a succession of cards each displaying the 
3 x 3 cm. base on the left, on which the solid brass block was 
placed each time, and other bases or "islands" differing £rom 
the 3 x 3 cm. base in size or shape or in both. Their 
measurements are 3 x 4 cm.; 2 x 2 cm.; 1 x 4 ctn. and 
2 x 6 cm. 
A participant in the pilot study tried so hard to keep 
the shape of the house the same as the solid block, that he had 
to be cautioned that the house could not be built over the sea, 
but must be built on the island. A card displaying this 
cautionary remark was produced in.order to cope with rare Ss 
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who disregarded the boundaries of the base. 
The construction made on the -1 x 4 cm. base was left 
standing until S had c~mpleted the final 2 x 6 cm. construction. 
This allowed for a comparison of these constructions with one 
another and with the solid block while Ss attention was drawn 
to the written words 11 same amount of space". Here, as in 
previous constructions, S is exposed to what Bruner et al:. 
( 1966) have termed "perceptual seduction". The difference in 
appearance of the three structures is considerable. S must 
distinguish between the appearance of the variation and its 
real identity (Elkind, 1969), a distinction that those Ss 
focusing on a single perceptual feature of the displays, 
usually the height of the constructions, will not achieve. 
The present method dealt with internal volume, or 
the conservation of the 36 cubes. Results were checked by 
adapting the procedure of immersing a solid object in water 
to the present experimental situation._ Two beakers containing 
equal quantities of water were produced. The solid 3 x 3 x 4 
cm~ brass block was immersed. The method of enquiry used in 
the previously described conservation of displaced volume task 
Wa$ applied. Card pictorially representing the immersion of 
the solid block and imagined immersion of the 2 x 6 x 3 cm. 
construction of cubes, followed by the three alternatives of 
water level in relation to the level in the beaker containing 
the solid block, were offered (See Appendix, PP• 129 - 130). 
Volume as "occupied" space, being the amount of space taken up 
• 
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by the 36 cubes in the water, was being measured as well as 
the complementary volume, that is, the volume of the water. 
These last two volumes are measured by the level of the 
water. Recognition of their conservation is shown by 
'-
anticipation that the water levels in two beakers will rise 
equally with the immersion of the model and transformation. 
Scoring Criteria 
While S constructed his "houses", detailed recordings 
of his responses were made, 11 ••• since the method.he adopts 
is no less revealing than the answer he obtains" (Piaget et al, 
1960, P• 357) • An analysis of these protocols revealed that 
no performance could be classified as preoperational, a level 
at which all reconstructions or comparisons of volume are made 
entirely in terms of one dimension only. Although differences 
in volume may be apparent to the preoperational child, he 
re£uses to build higher than the model to allow for a decrease 
in the size of the base or "island". Ss at an operational 
stage may occasionally experience difficulty in dissociating 
height from volume, however this is overcome when attention is 
drawn to the preceding explanatory cards and procedure, which 
were designed to convey by pictorial and written means that the 




The initial sub-stage of concrete operations is marked 
by the ability to dissociate the three notions of height, shape 
and volume. S recognises that a building constructed on a 
narrower base must be higher if it is to retain the same volume. · 
Progress is made in working out the relations between the three 
dimensions of the block, although S cannot cope with more than 
two simultaneously and the third is progressively adjusted to 
these two (Piaget~. op. cit.). Attempting to build a 
"house" on a small "island", S now builds a taller house, but 
he remains unable to consistently determine precisely how much 
taller it should be. Similarly, on a larger base, he is 
unsure as to how much shorter than the model his construction 
should be. He cannot yet make the differences compensatory 
by using metrical decomposition and recomposition. S may 
measure a dimension of the solid model with unit cubes, however 
his constructions are clearly based on logical multiplication, 
that is, he does not make exact compensations based on a unit 
0 
system. S will place the model against his construction while 
the building is·in progress and observe for instance that the 
base of the model may be broader by one layer. He then uses 
qualitative methods of compensation, that is, he transfers 
cubes from one dimension which is reduced to another which is · 
increased, hence an increase in he.ight compensates for .a decrease 
"in breadth or depth. Attempts to establish relations between 
the relevant dimensions give rise to compensations which for 
some reconstructions may be correct, while for others they are 
no better than approx~mations, with no equalisation of the 
• 
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differences. The difference may even be exaggerated, for 
example, building 7 storeys on the base 2 x 3 (=42), the model 
being 3 x 3 x 4 (=36). Compensations that are determined with 
accuracy are done by means of reconstruction. S may duplicate 
the model (3 x 3 x 4 cm.) on a base 1 x 4 first reconstructing 
the model and then transferring it to the 1 x 4 base, thereby 
transforming it. 
S recognises conservation, since he makes trans-
formations in his arrangements of cubes, though these are not 
based on exact compensations. The conservation of interior 
volume, of the amount of matter contained within an object, 
occurs through "qualitative coordination of subi:iivisions and 
changes of position ••• without a true metrical operation" 
(Piaget et al, ~.). Conservation doe~ not yet extend to 
the spatial relations between the object and its surroundings. 
When the model is immersed in water and S is required to 
anticipate the water level should a transformed block of unit 
cubes be immersed,the fact that interior volume may be 
conserved does not ensure conservation of the volume of water 
which is complementary. The volume whictt the cubes occupy in 
the water is not conceived of as identical to their interior 
volume. Why the resolution of this contradiction is a formal 
operational achievement will become apparent when responses 
at the formal level are discussed. 
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The equilibrium sub-stage of concrete operations is 
characterised by the appearance of metrical relations. Whereas 
in the previous sub-stage relations between the three dimensions 
were handled by logical multiplication, relations are now co-
ordinated by metrical means. S begins to measure accurately 
using the brass cubes as un.its of measurement by which to gauge 
the lengths of all three dimensions. He is thus using numbers 
of metrical relations to substantiate his successive estimates. 
He may however revert to qualitative methods of compensation on 
occasions. Measurement at this sub-stage amounts to a 
"synthesis of subdivision and changes of position" (Piaget et al, 
ibid.o P• 380). S does not carry- out mathematical multiplication, 
and therefore cannot establish numerical relations between area 
and volume. In an attempt to calculate the volume of the solid 
model, S can be observed enveloping the surfaces and counting 
the cubes used to construct them. 
This approach to the problem indicates that S has found 
a compromise between logical multiplication of the relations 
between dimensions and attempts at using mathematical calculations., 
by considering volume as if it were the result of the addition of 
areas. At this sub-stage S is dominated by topological notions 
of volume. Measurement of the three dimensions with the unit 
cubes is made, but S does not understand that by multiplying these 
measurements he will arrive at ~he sum of units that would be 
needed to make an exact copy of the solid model. The conservation 
of volume is limited to interior volume. The volume occupied by 
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an object in relation to its surrounding spatial medium is not 
comprehended as invariant. Sis distracted by the fact that.a 
volume which is transformed changes in surface area thus seeming 
to occupy more or less space in relation to its surroundings. 
The initial sub-stage of formal operations is 
characterised by the ability to make mathematical 
multiplications of three-dimensional measurements. S thus 
discovers that two volumes are equal if the products of their 
dimensions are the same. He will measure the three dimensions 
of the solid model with the unit cubes and will consistently 
succeed in reproducing the volume of the model, building with 
unit cubes on the various bases supplied. A second decisive 
achievement is the discovery of "volume occupied" in relation 
to the surrounding space •.. Modification of form in three 
dimensions implies variation in both length and area while the 
volume remains constant. The recognition that volume is 
invariant, in the sense that it occupies a fixed amount of 
space in relation to its surroundings, is achieved when S 
establishes the correct relations between the space which is 
contained and the areas which bound it. This involves not 
merely logical but mathematical multiplication expressed in Ss 
constructions as 3 x 3 x 4 = 2 x 3 x 6 = 2 x 2 x 9 = 1 x 4 x 9 = 
2 x 6 x 3 = 36. Interior volume can be measured and calculated 
without fault and its invariance extends to the surrounding space. 
This is a formal operational achievement since it implies the 





Formal thinking is essentially hypothetico-deductive. 
Unlike the concrete operational child whose deductions refer 
directly to perceived realities, the adolescent's deductions 
refer to propositions which are formulations of hypotheses and 
which postulate facts or events independently of whether or not 
they reaily occur. Within Piaget's theory, formal thought is 
I conceived of as a generalised orientation towards problem solving (Inhelder and Piaget, 1958) rather than as a specific 
behaviour. It implies an orientation toward organising data, 
isolating and controlling variables as in a combinatorial 
analysis and towards logical justification of hypotheses. 
Inhelder and Piaget (ibid. P• 107) have stated that 
11 •••• the formation of propositional _logic, which itself marks 
the appearance of formal thought, depends on the establishment 
of·a combinational system". Formal operations are character-
istically operations performed on the results of prior (concrete) 
operations, thus being termed "second-degree operations" 
(Piaget, 1950) • The combinatorial system is manifested in Ss 
ability to link a set of base elements or associations between 
elements with one another in all possible ways, extracting the 
relationships of implication, disjunction, exclusion and so forth. 
Confronted with an induction problem those Ss who have reached 
the formal operational stage will determine all the possible 
relations inherent in the problem and will systematically 
isolate all the individual variables including all possible 
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combinations of these variables. Such an approach guarantees 
that the possibilities will be exhaustively dealt with. 
A modified version of the well known experiment of 
combining chemical bodies, devised by Inhelder and Piaget 
(op. cit.), was applied in the present study. This experiment 
poses a problem that involves combinations directly, that is, 
it involves chemicals whose combination is indispensable if 
variable results are to be obtained. 
Materials and Procedure 
Placed on a table before S were four similar bottles · 
containing colourless, odourless liquids which were perceptually 
identical. Each bottle was labelled with a nU71lber. The names 
of the liquids were unknown to s. They were : 1. diluted 
sulphuric acid; 2. water; .3. oxygenated water; and 
4. thiosulphate. The fifth bottle, a smaller one, containing 
potassium iodide, was labelled g. 
dropper. 
Each bottle contained a 
Oxygenated water oxidises potassium iodide in an 
acid medium. Mixture (1 + 3 + g) will thus produce yellow. 
The water (2) is neutral, so that if it is added, the colour 
will not change. The thiosulphate (4) will bleach the 
mixture ( 1 + 3 + g). 
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Before S entered the room, E prepared two beakers, 
one containing 1 + 3, the other containing 2. These beakers 
were placed before s, and while he was watching, E poured 
several drops from bottle g into each beaker. The liquid 
in the beaker containing 1 + 3 turned yellow, while the 
liquid in the beaker containing 2 did not change in appearance. 
Since S did not know what liquids had been placed in the two 
beakers prior to his entrance, he knew only that g added to one 
liquid produced yellow, while g added to another liquid did not 
yield yellow. A series of cards was devised showing the larger 
bottles numbered 1 to 4 and the smaller bottle g and recording 
the pouring of liquid g into the two beakers, each containing 
liquid, and -the consequent appearance of colour in one. These 
cards recorded step by step the action of E that took place in 
front of s. They were left on display throughout the experiment 
enabling S to refer back to the initial procedure. These cards 
were devised to meet a need that arose in the pilot application 
of the test, namely the request of the occasional hearing S that 
E revise the procedure. The cards, pictorially representing 
the addition of drops from bottle g to the two beakers containing 
"unknown" liquids, served this purpose. The two beakers that had 
been used in this demonstration were then washed out and a beaker 
was placed before s. A card was presented which showed the four 
bottles plus bottle g and in the foreground an empty beaker under 
which was written "Make yellow". It was demonstrated by 
pantomime that S could wash out the beaker in a basin. This 
I • 
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was readily grasped since all Ss repeatedly rinsed out their. 
beakers before starting a fresh combination. 
Particularly among the deaf group, Ss were easily 
discouraged when they failed to produce yellow after a few 
attempts. This·necessitated the introduction of a card 
stating, "You ~ make yellow from these bottles". Piaget's 
"clinical method" involves the asking of leading questions and 
offering of suggestions, after it has become apparent that S 
is satisfied that he has tried all combinations. Scoring is 
however based on the spontaneous responses of s, while those 
responses elicited by_ prompting serve only to f'urther 
illustrate his limitations. Two "prompt cards'1 were never-
theiess devised. The first, stating "Try mixing two bottles 
with g" was presented to Ss limited to 1 x 1 associations. 
A card encouraging S to "Try to find another way to make yellow'' 
was shown to those Ss who had produced yellow and were satisfied 
with a single solution. 
There were 15 possible combinations in which the 
droppers could be squeezed, excluding permutations. 




Scoring was based on the criteria provided by 
Inhelder and Piaget (!~·) and the scale for rating manual 
responses (Wynns, 1967) which was theoretically ~d emp~rically 
derived following an extensive replication study of Piaget's 
combinatorial task on American children. 
At the initial sub-stage of concrete operations, S 
spontaneously and systematically associates the pottles 1 to 4 
with the element g, and /or combines the liquids of all the 
bottles at the same time. Even when faced with failure, .. he 
does not spontaneously use two-by-two combinations. Prompting 
may elicit a few two-by-t~o or three-by-three combinations, but 
S is unable to use these systematically. He possesses logical 
multiplication operations, but of one-by-one correspondence 
only. The above behaviours are considered a sine qua non for 
classification in this sub-stage. 
Additional features are sometimes present. S may 
have a purely quantitative hypothesis, thus distributing the 
quantity of drops from the bottles differently. His hypothesis 
may, on the other hand, be related to serial ordering. He will 
thus begin to try some of the possible permutations rather than 
combinations. His protocol will convey the general impression · 
that "no true combinatorial operation has appeared as yet, but 
only correspondences and serial ordering - i.e., first degree 
combinations based on fixed class inclusions" (Inhelder and 




The equilibrium sub-stage of concrete operations 
is characterized by the appearance of "multiplicative operations 
with the empirical introduction of n-by-n combinations" 
(Inhelder and Piaget,~., P• 114). As in the preceding sub-
stage, S begins by multiplying each element by g, or he may mix 
·them all together at once. There is however, a visible 
progression beyond the previous sub-stage in that S spontaneously 
tries two-by-two or three-by-three combinations, each time with 
g. The fact that S can impose no system on wh~t remain 
"tentative empirical efforts", defines the upper limit of Flis . 
sub-stage. He will not attain all the possible two-by-two 
(x g) combinations since he is unable to approach the problem 
systematically. He is clearly not enslaved to the "actual" as 
the pre-operational child would be, because he can and does deal 
with the "potential", though his conception of possibilities is 
limited. Any discover~es that S may make about the elements are 
fortuitous, since he has no systematic method of proof. 
The most outstanding achievement of the initial sub-
stage of formal ·operations is the appearance of a systematic 
n-by-n combinatorial system. The presence of a systematic 
method indicates that s is disposed to thinking in terms of all 
the possible combinations of the elements. A further innovation 
which appears at this sub-stage is s•s· dissatisfaction with a 
single solution and determination to look for others, since he 
£eels the necessity to test the full range of possibilities • 
. ~ 
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The hypothetico-deductive approach of S is best 
illustrated by the way he deals with elements 2 and 4. By 
systematically testing the presence or absence of 2 with the 
colour, he is able to deduce that 2 is ineffective. The 
following formula derived by Inhelder and Piaget (!.£.~:!!.·~ 
P• 119), illustrates that Scan see the possibilities: 
(p.q) v (p.q) v (p.q) v (p.q) = (p*q) 
In this formula p = presence of colour, q = presence of 
element 2, p and q are the negations of p and q, v ="or", 
and * == a "tautology" or. "complete affirmation", i.e., 
water (2) has no effect. 
S also realises that element 4 and the colour are 
incompatible. He understands that: 
(p.q) v (p.q) = ( p vv q) 
Now q designates .the presence of 4 and vv = reciprocal 
exclusion. A protocol at this level should give the overall 
impression that·s is formulating and systematically testing 
hypotheses, isolating and controlling variables, providing 
logical justification for his findings. 
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A.2. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
All the scores obtained should be interpreted as 
being on an ordinal scale rather than an interval scale, 
therefore non-parametric procedures based as far as possible 
on rankings were applied. 
In order to establish hypothesis 1 it is necessary 
to determine that the inferiority of the deaf group on the 
language tests is statistically significant. An appropriate 
non-parametric test is the Mann-Whitney U test (s ieg~el, 1956). 
For the Paragraph Meaning Test each hearing S was ranked ahead 
of every deaf S (Appendix, Table 3) giving U = o, which is 
significant at the .001 level. For the 6 sub-tests of the 
Woodward Nonsense Test the respective values of U were 
u = 15.5~ u = 41, 
(Appendix, Table 4). 
U = 9 , U = 5, U = 2 and U = 0 
These values are all significant at 
the .001 level, with the exception of the value V = 41, which 
is significant at the .025 level. 
The extent of the deaf sample's linguistic 
.retardation is most evident in the reading ages obtained from 
the scores on the Paragraph Meaning Test (Appendix, Table 5). 
The chronological ages of the deaf group ranged from 13:1 to 
14:10, however four Ss had reading ages between 10:1 and 10:4, 
while the remaining scores were so low that they could not be 
converted, since the tables do not assign reading ages below 
10 years. In contrast, the reading ages for the hearing group 
ranged from 11:7 to beyond 15:6. 
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For the deaf group the product-moment correlation 
co-efficient between the score for the Paragraph Meaning 
Test and the total score of the Woodward Nonsense Test 
was calculated as r = .604. The correlation coefficient 
of the hearing group was r = .590. The correlation for 
each group is significant at the .05 level. 
In order that results on the Piaget-type tasks 
might be displayed in tabular form, the number.1 was used 
to denote the initial sub-stage of concrete operations, 
2 to denote the equilibrium sub-stage of concrete operations 
and 3 to denote the initial sub-stage of formal operations. 
The results are presented in Table 6 below. 
To determine the reliability of these ratings, 
a judge, with no knowledge of whether the protocols were 
from the experimental or control group, rated one third of 
the protocols drawn at random from the data. From these 
ratings a product-moment correlation coefficient. of inter-
judge reliability of .935 was obtained. For this 
calculation it was necessary to treat the scores 1, 2 and 
































RATINGS ON PIAGET-TYPE TASKS FOR 
THE DEAF AND HEARING 
Prob. Volume Space 
2 1 1 
3 2 2 
2 3 3 
3 1 1 
2 1 2 
2 1 1 
2 3 2 
3 1 2 
1 2 1 
2 2 2 
2 2 1 
1 3 2 
2 3 2 
1 3 3 
3 1 3 
2 2 2 
2 2 1 
1 2 2 
2 3 2 
1 3 2 
1 2 2 
2 3 . 2 
2 1 1 
3 2 2 
3 2 3 





























The results in Table 6 are summarized in the 
£ollowing four tables. In these tables LCO = lower (initial) 
concrete operations, UCO = upper (equilibrimn) concrete 
operations, and LFO = lower (initial) formal operations. 
TABLE 7 
PROBABILITY CONCEPTS: NUMBER OF SUBJECTS 













DISPLACED VOLUME~ NUMBER OF SUBJECTS 













(n == 14) 
(n == 12) 
EQUIVALENI' THREE-DIMENSIONAL SPACE: NUMBER OF 















COMBINATIONS: NUMBER OF SUBJECTS 











The hypothesis to be tested st.ates that the 
inferiority of the deaf group on the Piaget-~ype tasks will 
not be statistically significant. On the probability task 
(Table 7) the deaf Ss performed slightly better than the 
hearing Ss, thus no statistical testing of this table is 
necessary. On the remaining three tasks the performance of 
the hearing group was superior. Various statistical tests 
were applied but none indicated that the superiority of the 
hearing group was statistically significant. 
2 
The X test was applied to Table 8 and 9. The 
expected values in the cells are rather small, but the 
discussions in Cochran (1952, 1954) indicate that the x2 test 
is applicable. In cases where expected values are about two 
2 or more in all cells and five or more in some cells, the X 
test can be used provided that the value obtained for x2 is 
well above or below the critical value. On Table 8 the value 
of x2 is 2.66, while on Table 9,the value of x2 is 2.73. 
With df = 2 the critical value of x2 , at the .05 significance 
level, is 5.99 (Siegel, op. cit.). Since the observed values 
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of x2 are so far below the critical value, it can be safely 
concluded that these values are not statistically significant. 
Table 10 contains only one S at the lower formal 
operational sub-stage, therefore Ss in the upper concrete 
and lower formal sub-stages were combined and the Fisher exact 







UCO & LFO 
10 
6 
This is a table of the form AB 
CD with A + B = '.!A and 
C + D = 12. Since B = 10, a table of this form is 
significant if the value of Dis.at most 3 (ibid,, Table· 1, 
P• 265) • The observed value of D = 6: is thus not significant. 
Graphs in which the results on the Piaget-type tasks 
are plotted against the scores on the· language tests are shown 
in the Appendix (Figures 4 and 5). The first graph uses 
scores on the Paragraph Meaning Test, the second uses 
percentage scores calculated from the total score for each S 
on the Woodward Nonsense Test. It can be seen from these 
graphs that success on the Piaget-type tasks was largely 
independent of performance on either of the language tests. 
A major finding of the study is the confirmation of 
hypothesis 3 by the fact that six deaf Ss performed at the 




Research into the modification of Piaget's tasks to 
allow for the exclusion or minimal use of language in 
. instruction, performance and as a criterion of success has 
the potential of·extending the application of the tasks to 
linguistically deprived-children. The criticism has been 
raised that certain of Piaget's tasks demand of the subject 
I 
an understanding of terminology that is more advanced.than 
the conceptual understanding which the task purports to 
measure (Braine, 1968). The problem of evaluating the 
authenticity of level of functioning by means of the subject's 
manual responses alone must be acknowledged. Sigel ( 1968) 
conside~s that studies applying Piaget-type tasks that do not 
require a verbal explanation from the child cannot sufficiently 
separate conceptual and perceptual elements of the task. In 
contrast, the efficacy of an approach using the child's verbal 
explanations to help estimate his cognitive level has been 
questioned by Elkind (1968). Expressing reservations about 
Piaget's use of verbal explanations in assessing the presence 
or absence of conservation concepts, Elkind states that:· 
"Verbal explanations are really post hoc rationalizations rather 
than veridical reflections of the processes leading to 
co~servation" (~. p. 464). Only those tasks having solid 
criteria for evaluating_manual responses were used in the 
present study. 
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Language was effectively eliminated from the 
probability and displaced volume tasks, where the space and 
combinatorial tasks were less successfully adapted, since some 
written instructions had to be combined with pantomimed and 
pictorial instructions. Possible improvements in the 
administration procedure of these tasks became apparent 
during their experimental application and may be usefully 
incorporated in future research. In the conservation of 
displaced volume task the introduction of a few '1control steps" 
in which pairs of unequal volume are presented would ensure 
that the "same" response would not always be correct. The 
task requiring the judgement and measurement of equivalent · 
three dimensional space could perhaps have been simplified by 
the substitution of proper nouns for pronouns in the written 
instructions. The deaf experience difficulty in learning the 
correct use of pronouns (Myklebust, 1966). 
The severity of the retardation of the deaf group 
in comparison to the hearing control on measures of linguistic 
knowledge, clearly emerges· from a qualitative and quantitative 
analysis of performance on the Paragraph Meaning Test and the 
Woodward Nonsense Test of Structural Meaning, thus confirming 
the first major.hypothesis of the study. The i~feriority of 
the deaf group in ability to comprehend paragraphs and on all 




The hypothesis that a positive and significant 
correlation would exist for each group between the two language 
tests administered was also confirmed. This indicates the 
importance of the role of ~tructural cues to meaning in the 
comprehension of sentences~ The correlations obtained should 
be considered in the knowledge that the lexical component of 
linguistic meaning played a part in the Paragraph Meaning Test, 
while it was excluded from the Woodward Test. 
Paragraph meaning tests are traditionally used to 
quantify the linguistic knowledge of the deaf, being good 
indicators of overall linguistic ability.. The Woodward 
Nonsense Test measures control over specific items 0£ 
linguistic structure, namely ability to group words into 
meaningful units (sentence recognition); ability to interpret 
markers of sequence (sequence signals); to recognize implicitly 
form classes (part of speech membership); ability to interpret 
meanings carried by subject and object structures (subjects and 
objects); and abili~y to interpret sentences containing 
modifiers (modifiers). In addition to measuring specific 
linguistic skills, the Woodward Nonsense Test is a " · ••• valid 
indicator of general language development" (Woodward, 1963, 
P• 54). The pattern of performance across the six sub-tests 
allows for an analysis of the subj~ct's knowledge of the 
properties of linguistic structure considered in certain 
theoretical models (Bruner, 1966; Vygotsky, 1962) to operate 
as a "set of rules" for organizing information and greatly 
increasing the range of problem solving. The inferior 
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performance of the deaf on all sections of the Nonsense Test 
indicat.es a lack of mastery of the basic structure of language, 
namely predication, causation, modification, categoriality and 
hierarchy. These properties of language are considered by 
Bruner (op. cit.) to provide the child with principles of 
organization by which to bring the world of experience under 
control, organizing events in a form 11 ••• isomorphic with the 
structural principles of syntax" (ibid. p. 47). 
Developmental trends in control over language 
structure are the subject matter of some empirical studies 
(Miller and Ervin, 1964), however the establishment of norms 
.for tracing patterns in normal and abnormal language 
development with the Nonsense Test is as yet a research goal 
(Woodward, 1968). The retardation of the deaf group cannot 
therefore be expressed in specific developmental terms, however 
indications were that among the deaf .group scoring tended to be· 
~onfined to the earlier items of the sections which were graded 
for difficulty. 
The results of the hearing and deaf group on the 
four Piaget-type tasks present a mixed picture. Nobody was 
restricted on all problems to solutions consistent with 
classification in the initial sub-stage of concrete operations 
nor did any subject succeed consistently at the formal 
operational level. On the volume, space and combinatorial 
tasks the performance of the deaf as a group was inferior to 
that _of the hearing, however, this inferiority was not 
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statistically significant, thus confirming hypothesis 2. 
On the probability concept task the performance of the deaf 
was actually slightly superior to that of the hearing. 
The difference in educational achievement between 
the deaf and hearing group gives rise to the problem of the 
effects of schooling on performance on Piaget's tasks. 
Although most of the deaf subjects had not reached an equivalent 
standard placement to the hearing, they had attended school for 
at least as many years as the hearing subjects. Studies of 
the effects of schooling on Piaget's tasks have tended to 
focus on comparisons of schooled and unschooled children 
(Goodnow and Bethon, 1966; Greenfield~' 1966). It is 
possible that children learn more quickly about physical 
volume, for example, as a result of being exposed in school to 
learning situations where the effectiveness of the relevant 
and non-effectiveness of the irrelevant variables may be made 
e_vident in the same experiment (Lovell and Ogilvie, 1968). 
Such information would however be more successfully assimilated 
by the child in whom the appropriate schemata had already 
evolved. 
The series of investigations into the ~ognitive 
development of the deaf by Furth (1966a) have indicated a 
striking similarity between the deaf and hearing in ability to 
comprehend and use logical symbols. The deaf however lagged 
behind when a discovery principle ·was introduced suggesting 
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••• a lack of initiative in reasoning" (~., P• 147). Furth 
relates this rigidity in thinking to the influence of long-term 
"experiential deprivation" among the deaf and cautions that 
cognizance should be taken of the 11 ••• fairly important 
discovery component in Piaget •s tasks" (~., P• 158) which 
may be a possible contributing factor where differences between 
deaf and hearing are found. Experimental validation of Furth's 
"experiential deficiency" hypothesis is being undertaken 
(Youniss and Furth, 1967). 
There was no evidence of any definite relationship 
between level of achievement on the Piaget-type tasks and 
performance on either of the language tests (see Figures 4 
and 5). This lends support to the theoretical position that 
language is not a central, constitutive component of operative 
thinking (Piaget, 1963). 
The absence of a consistent task-inter-task 
relationship among the results of both groups is a familiar 
feature of performance across a variety of Piaget's tasks. 
D~calages occur " ••• as a result of the differences in 
content to which the conceptual structures must be applied and, 
.also, of the differences according to the type of activity in 
which the ·structure must function" (Szeminska, 1965). 
¢!'."'-, 
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Hypothesis 3'is tested by the presence or absence 
of task solutions at the formal operational level in the deaf 
s'ample. Five of the twelve deaf subjects responded at a 
formal operational level on one task, and a sixth used formal 
reasoning on two tasks. On the probability task three deaf 
subjects were able to respond appropriately to the changing 
proportions of the coloured balls and predicted the probabilistic 
events accordingly. Three other boys conserved displaced 
volume including the 1tems presenting two balls of markedly 
different weight but of equal size. In addition to 
successfully solving the latter problem, one of the deaf boys 
was able to approach the task of equivalent space using a 
method indicative of the presence of formal operational 
structures. No subject in the deaf group was completely 
successful regarding testing all possibilities in the 
combinatorial task. Furth ( 1969) states that " ••• success 
on- any one task is a more valid indication of the presence of 
the prerequisite intellectual capacity than failure is· 
indicative of the absence of this capacity". A consideration 
of the responses of the deaf in comparison with the hearing 
control indicates that manifestations of logical thinking were 
present without any important deficiencies in the operatory 
structures that the present tasks purport to measure • 
. ~. 
Cognitive theories have generally accepted that 
severely linguistically deprived deaf children can _achieve 
concrete operat~onal thinking, however theories in which 
language is given an explanatory or indispensable role in 
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intellectual development (Bernstein, 1961, Bruner, 1966) have 
long held that the severely linguistically deprived are 
restricted to the concrete operational stage and never develop 
formal operational thinking structures. 
The role of language as a determinant of cognitive 
development must be distinguished from the role of language 
as facilitating cognitive skills. This distinction is 
reflected in Piaget's (1963) discussion following his analysis 
of the proposition that language is a sufficient condition in 
the formation of intellectual operations. He concludes that 
language does not play a truly constitutive role in the 
development of logical thinking structures while conceding 
that language may play an indirect or supportive role in the 1 
elaboration of these structl.lres. 
Piaget considers that observations of the partial 
isomorphism between the principal operational structures and 
the syntactic properties of language have led to the more 
extreme theories that reduce intellectual operations to 
language. Bruner and his associates have concentrated their 
· empirical efforts on providing evidence that " ••• the syntactic 
properties of language •• ~ relate to the logical structures of 
thought" (Greenfield et al, 1966, p. 299). Piaget and Inhelder 
(1969) ·acknowledge " ••• the existence of para.llel mechanisms, 
of parallel constructive processes in cognitive development 
and in the acquisition of syntactic structures'' (~., p. 151). 
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Piaget's descriptions and observations of sensory-motor 
structures suggest however that language does not structure 
thought, but rather, " ••• the infant has to acquire co-
ordinations of sensory-motor schemes, which will develop into 
. operational structures ••• before he can begin to understand 
and produce syntactic structures" (~., P• 152). Language 
acquisition is considered to be based on cognitive develop-
mental mechanisms, the progressive and systematic co-ordinations 
of sensory-motor schemes playing an important part in the 
formation of language. Observations of similarities between 
Piaget's descriptions of sensory-motor structures and Choms~y•s 
descriptions of the deep structure in language (see section D.l., 
pp. 28 - 29), together with the fact that sensory-motor ... 
intelligence reaches its final stage of development prior to 
language .acquisition, have prompted Piagetian psycholinguists 
to conclude that " ••• language is not the source of logic, 
but is on the contrary structured by logic" (Sinclair-de-Zwart, 
1969, P• 325). 
Within Piaget's theory, language is recognized as 
only one of the ways in which the semiotic £unction manifests 
itself. Symbolic.play, gestural expression, deferred imitation 
and so forth also play a part. ·rn considering the transition 
from sensory-motor to representational and operative intelligence, 
the importance of the semiotic £unction as a whole is invoked 
within.the theory. 
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The major finding of the present study is that 
linguistic skill or deficiency was largely independent of the 
level attained on the cognitive tasks administered, suggesting 
that language did not .influence the development of intellectual 
structures of the subjects in any direct or decisive way. The 
implications of this finding for educational practice are 
discussed below. 
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION 
The recent vigorous movement to effect a closer 
liaison between cognitive research and educatiorial practice 
has focused on curriculum planning within the context of 
Piag.et 's developmental findings (Sigel, 1969, Lunzer, 1960). 
Research into the selection of teaching materials and methods 
aims at activating the development of thought, £acilitating 
rather than "acceleratingi• the passage from a lower to a 
higher cognitive stage. A meticulous analysis of the 
contents of curricula and teaching methods by Szeminska (1965) · 
has revealed a predominance of teaching strategies that 
impart in£ormation through the static verbal description of 
data without active experimentation. Bruner (1966) says 0£ 
the school situation, "Verbal understanding, the ability to 
say it and to enumerate instances becomes the criterion of 
learning in such a context •••" {Bruner's emphasis, PP• 62 
63). Since teaching in the lower standards is based on the 
"intuitive method" (Szeminska, op. cit.) in which descriptions 
0£ perceived events or the representatipn of past experiences 
--
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is the rule, the child is orientated toward reproducing what 
he has learned through memory rather than by reasoning. 
Teaching at the secondary level " ••• becomes increasingly 
analytic and relies on the progressive exploitation of what 
Piaget calls "'formal operations' •••" (Bernstein, 1961, 
P• 307) • The pupil is obliged to use formal operations without 
having had, in the preceding period, the opportunity to develop 
concrete operational structures. This results in the trans-
mission of knowledge before pupils possess the intellectual 
structures to assimilate it successfully. The need exists 
for a serious revision of school curricula to adapt them to 
the intellectual possipi1ities 0£_ the student, while reforming 
methods of teaching to uncover a means to facilitate the 
transition from concrete to formal operations. The curriculum 
sequence should be designed in harmony with the child's changing 
cognitive status. This would require an accurate assessment of 
the pupil's cognitive structure at a given point in development. 
At present Piagetian tasks do not constitute a reliable standard-
ized test series. Substantial progress in the replication 
studies (e.g. Lovell, 1961; Lunzer, 1965) suggests that 
Piagetian tasks may conceivably be used as diagnostic tools for 
educational assessment. 
A direct application of conclusions derived from the 
present experimental study is the need to question the emphasis 
on verbal skills in current educational methods for deaf and 
hearing. In the education of the deaf the traditional emphasis 
on oral media of communication together with the prohibition of 
I. 
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signing, has necessitated the devotion of a large part of the 
curriculum to the teaching of lipreading and articulation 
skills. While the importance of teaching language to the 
profoundly deaf child is .not being underestimated, (see 
Section D.l., PP• 30 -. 31) this constant exposure to formal 
linguistic training results in other spheres of cognitive 
' growth, for example, motor and perceptual development, being 
placed secondary.to linguistic achievement (Furth, 1969). 
The efficacy of traditional language programs with the 
congenitally deaf who have a severe hearing loss is a hotly 
debated issue (Moores, 1969). 
Furth (1966a) notes that some of the verbal rigour 
in educational disciplines has been relaxed with an increase 
in the use of audio-visual and other concrete aids to learning. 
Piaget (1964) takes a stand along with Montessori, in stressing 
"self discovery" in the classroom as the crucial element in 
facilitating cognitive reorganization. "The subject must be 
active, must transform things, and find the structure of his 
own actions on the objects" (ibid., P• 4). The child at the 
concrete operational stage, for instance, must be given the 
opportunity to actually manipulate objects or task 
materials in question. A teaching strategy being devised by 
Lavatelli ( 1967) utilizing the concept of "action learning" 
for developing hypothetico-deductive reasoning skills, places 
emphasis entirely on the enactive level, to use Bruner's 
terminology, and •• ••• no attempt is made to hurry emergence· 
0£ the symbolic stage" (~., P• 9). The child is given the. 
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opportunity to solve problems at the concrete operational 
level, performing actions represented by the logical groupings, 
for example, associativity, reversibility, or the higher order 
multiplicative relationships and classification~. Lavatelli 
(1967) suggests that models which have a strong visual 
component may be useful, for example, a two-pan balance scale 
could be introduced, actually showing the child that doing the 
same thing to both sides of the balance changes nothing as far 
as equilibrium is concerned. Lavatelli •s hypothesis is that 
providing Ss in the intermediate grades with endugh concrete 
experiences, engaging them in .activities involving the 
combinatorial method and proportionality over a long-term 
training program,will facilitate the emergence of formal 
thought in adolescence. 
/ 
The advantages of such a thinking orientated rather 
than verbal orientated approach during the early school years, 
though originally devised to meet the needs of hearing children, 
holds considerable potential with regard to the education 0£ 
the deaf. Flavell (1966, P• 369 ~ 370) has stated that the 
application· of Piaget's views on educational method involves 
an analysis of the content to be mastered in terms of the 
operations implicit upon it and arranging the l~arning materials 
in a manner allowing the pupil to actually carry out the 
operations himself. · 11once the £undament al action patterns are 
mastered, the training program could gradually draw the child 
away from explicit concrete material settings to •••••••••••• 
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internalized operations at ever-increasing distances from the 
immediate perceptual context" (Hooper, 1969, P• 430). The 
need for encouraging-children to discover principles of 
thinking through activity is becoming widely recognized 
(Furth, op. cit.). 
The techniques used in the present study to 
present Piaget-type problems non-verbally suggest that 
advanced problems inviting solutions at a concrete or formal 
operational level may be posed through pictorial representation 
in the classroom leading to experimentation via a wide range of 
concrete media. Science curriCU.la are potentially the most 
adaptable to such revision. The restrictive environment of 
the profoundly deaf, a consequence of lack of auditory input, .. 
could be improved to a large extent if non-verbal methods of 
instruction and communication were encouraged i~ the home and 
school environment in the early years. The fi~dings of . 
Stuckless and Birch ( 1966) and Brill (1970) sug~est that a 
manual communication system at a very early age has a 
beneficial influence on the development 0£ both thinking 
processes and language skills in the deaf. 
Furth (1966a) describes a demonstration of a non-
verbal teaching technique to encourage logical thinking at a 
level which marks the beginning.~£ formal operations. Deaf 
children aged 9, 13 and 16 years were presented with a series 
of cards containing.· symbols £or .affirmation, negation. conjunction 
and exclusive disjunction.. After four days of teaching even 
) 
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some of the younger deaf children showed that they could 
manipulate the symbols in a logical manner being presented 
with a situation in which they were not penaliz~d for their 
linguistic incompetence. 
The educational implications derived from the 
findings of the present study pertain also to a great variety 
of children who are substantially handicapped i~ linguistic 
skills, for example, the socially deprived child (Bernstein, 
op.cit.); the aphasic, and those children with specific 
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APPLICATION OF MANN-vmITNEY u TEST TO SCORES 
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TABLE 4 (Continued) 
APPLICATION OF MANN-WHITI\TEY U TEST TO SCORES ON SUB-TESTS OF WOODFARD NONSENSE TEST 
Parts of Speech Subjects and Objects Modifiers 
Deaf Heari??-g Deaf Hearing Deaf Hearing 
40,40 66 ·41,41 
38,38,38,38,38 63 37,37,37 
36,36,36,36 58 36,36,36 
34,34 34 57 35 
32 56,56 34 
28 53 33,33,33 
26,26 52 29 
24,24 49 27 
22,22,22 48 25 
20 47,47 24 
18 41,41 46 21,21 






u = 5 u = 2 ·10 u = 0 






READING AGES ON PARAGRAPH MEANING 
TEST FOR THE DEAF AND HEARING 
C.A. + R.A. +. 
DEAF 
s.v. 13:5 10:1 
D.H. 13: 10 Below 10 
A.J. 14:7 10:4 
s.w. 14:2 10:4 
J.U. 14: 10 Below 10 
A.E. 13:0 Below 10 
A.B. 14:7 Below 10 
A.M. 13:9 Below 10 
K.W. 14:4 Below 10 
L.P. 13:7 Below 10 
R.P. 13:3 Below 10 
J.O. 13:1 10:1 
HEARING 
M.G. 13:8 Above 15:6 
B.F. 13: 11 15:6 
A.N. 14:7 15:6 
A.H. 13:5 13:5 
G.M. 14:1 13:5 
B.C. 13:6 12:3 
T.A. 14:1 13:5 
J.B. 13:6 12:0 
S.L. 13:9 11: 7 
A.C. 13:9 15:6 
K.G. 13:0 11:7 
G.L. 13:1 15:6 
S.K. 14:9 12:0 
J.C. 14:1 14:3 
+ C.A. = chronological age 
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DEAF AND HEARING: OPERATIONAL LEVEL ON PIAGET-TYPE TASKS AND PERFORMANCE 
ON THE WOODWARD NONSENSE TEST OF STRUCTURAL MEANING 
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